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INTRODUCTION
That the human rights system lies at the corner stone of any democratic
system is undisputed. A number of entitlements are entrenched as
human rights and laws are designed and formulated to be interpreted in
the most rights-friendly way.
The question is not whether the system of human rights exists. It is about
the true benefits they have extended beyond their existence on paper.
This calls for a need to examine the extent to which these rights are
enforced through courts. Despite the claim of interdependence and
interrelationship of all human rights, problems of enforcement of socio-
economic rights are huge than other categories of human rights. The
involvement of courts in the system of socio-economic rights is very
controversial despite various efforts to clarify the point.
The growing emphasis given to socio-economic rights has raised the
endless tussle on the justiciability of these rights. These rights have
attracted huge attention accompanied by hot debate mainly due to the
need for serious budgetary commitments. This paper has attempted to
reveal both the arguments for and against the appropriateness of these
rights for court inquiry. The paper concludes that objections to the
justiciability of socio-economic rights are more of political and
overstated.
Chapter one deals generally with socio-economic rights and the basic
obligations they impose on governments. The exact elements and
contents of these rights are defined. What constitutes a violation is also
clarified. The progressive and qualified nature of these rights, which
casts shadow on their justiciability, is analyzed. The base of both the
arguments for and against justiciability is built here.
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Chapter two defines justiciability and compares it with very related but
different concepts. More importantly, the objections to the justiciability
of socio-economic rights are outlined. The responses to these objections
are included. Independent arguments tend to prove the competence and
legitimacy of courts in scrutinizing alleged violations of socio-economic
rights. The experience of major regional (Continental) courts on the area
is reviewed to illuminate the arguments. The chapter asserts and proves
the justiciability of these rights.
Chapter three is designed to explore the jurisprudence on justiciability of
socio-economic rights in some selected states. The selections and the
consequent stance on the issue is reflective of the two self-standing sides
of the prevailing debate. It will help Ethiopia to reap the merits of
experience.
Amidst a tremendous lack of resource materials, Chapter four is framed
to give a taste of the Ethiopian jurisprudence on the area. This section
examines the three sources of socio-economic rights in Ethiopia in an
attempt to take the desired stance on the justiciability debate. The
problems involved in courts enforcing socio-economic rights are revealed
and tackled. In addition to the conclusion drawn in chapter two, this
chapter proves the presence of laws supporting the role of courts in
adjudicating socio-economic rights.
All in all, this paper confirms the ultimate role of courts as guarantor of
all human rights including especially socio-economic rights. It affirms the
justiciability of socio-economic rights.
VI
Chapter I
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1. Definition, Importance, Distinction, Beneficiaries
The modern law of human rights can be structured in to three groups. The first
one deals with civil and political rights. The second, and which is the concern of
this chapter covers what are called Economic, Social and cultural (ESe, here
after) rights. The third category includes solidarity or group rights. It is these
three categories that form the system of human rights. Despite this distinction
the modern human rights system is characterized by the recognition of the
system as forming a single whole and hence reducing the value of the
classification. The concern here is on the second class of human rights law
which has become the point of controversy in recent years.
Ese rights are designed to protect and ensure the basic necessities of life of
every human being. These rights include the rights to food, to shelter, to health,
to education, to work, to freely participate in ones culture etc considered to be
the determinants of a complete life. These elements are of fundamental
importance to all human beings. Yet hundreds of millions around the world
have neither access to these basic needs nor influence the policy decisions that
affect their daily survival. Socio-economic rights empower people to take an
active role in challenging the source of their impoverishment.
Economic and social rights spell out the indispensable needs of every
individual. They provide every human being guarantees of minimal protection
and survival. ESe rights provide legal, political and moral framework for people
to challenge government policies and programs accountable for failing to
provide rights such as those related to housing, food, health, water etc. These
rights designate the move far from 'negative' government, from thinking that
the poor are a special and natural category of people and are "not the
responsibilities of society and government but only of church and charity."!
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ESC rights primarily benefit those least fortunate citizens of our world. They
are founded on concepts of justice and human dignity. They enable people to
re-conceive their basic needs as rights they are entitled to claim and not as
charity to receive. ESCrights create mechanisms by which the most vulnerable,
powerless, voiceless sections of the society in government actions will live free
from hunger, for instance, and entitle them participation in government
decision making. These rights imply a government that is proactive, intervening
and committed to economic and social policy planning for the society, so as to
satisfy socio-economic rights of the individual.
The definition of socio-economic rights implies that the rights deemed
fundamental include not only freedom which government must not invade, but
also rights to what is essential for human well-being which government must
actively provide or promote. They imply a government that is active,
intervening and deeply concerned with fulfilling the socio- economic rights of
the individual citizens under its governance. Those rights declare that all
individuals are entitled to have society supply their basic human needs and
other socio- economic benefits in case the individual is incapable to get them.
They imply that the far reaching gap between the rich and the poor is not the
result of the difference in talent and hard work but to a great extent of luck and
inconsiderate government policies and programs.
Corruption and mismanagement have no place in a government which strives to
respect, protect and fulfill Economic and social rights. They are halls in which
the ideals of a democratic government are established. They create legal
mechanisms to demand concrete remedies for policies that violate those rights.
The respect and protection of these rights results in a more transparent and all-
involving allocation of resources. They aim at reducing the unacceptably biased
wealth distribution our world is experiencing today. Economic and social rights
provide the basic tools by which we can challenge global inequality. The socio-
economic conditions of the world are declining through time for millions of our
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fellows, the gap between the rich and the poor in rising at a frightening speed
with the corning of globalization. It is only through the respect, protection and
fulfillment of social- economic rights that a state can achieve its goal of
providing its least fortunate citizens with their basic needs. That is why ESe
rights greatly matter.
It is possible, though illusory and difficulty to distinguish between what
constitutes a social or an economic right. This is because many rights clearly
have both an economic and social aspect. In fac!t all the rights considered social
have significant economic implications.
At the core of social rights is the right to an adequate standard of living. This
right articulates the broadest concern of social rights. It requires that people
enjoy the bare minimum necessary for a decent and fulfilling lif'e." Nowadays
there is an approach to consider "adequate standard of living" as to mean the
rights to get the "basic needs" of an individual which is a very wide concept. For
someone to enjoy an adequate standard of living he/she should at least enjoy
the necessary subsistence rights, that is, the right to adequate food, and
nutrition, the right to clothing, the right to housing and the necessary
conditions of care.
To make the enjoyment of social rights possible, economic rights are needed.
Such economic rights are the right to property, the right to work, which is wide
and includes the conditions of work, and the right to social security 3. We can
see that economic rights have a two fold function. On the one hand/hey are
the foundations for the social entitlements, on the other hand they are the
bases of independence and freedom, especially the right to property provides a
salient example in this respect. These rights need to supplement each other,
The right to work provides income which may ensure an adequate standard of
living whereas the right to social security supplements, and sometimes
substitutes, in case of for instance, unemployment, disability or old age, the
income which would otherwise be derived by work.
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The right to participate in cultural life is another component which is included
under the UDHI).4 and the ICESCR.5 Both these instruments contain the right to
take part in cultural life, the right to enjoy and share the benefits of scientific
advancement, the right to benefit from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which the beneficially is the author. The ICESCR in addition
contains the freedom of scientific research and creative activity." The notion of
cultural rights is closely connected to the right to education and the non-
discrimination clauses inferred in a number of conventions.
Another important aspect of cultural rights is the right of minority groups to
preserve their cultural identity included in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR)/ and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC).8 It must be noted that this right has implications for civil and political
rights as well as socio-economic rights. That is why cultural rights have a place
in the non-discrimination and minority provisions of civil and political rights.
The beneficiaries of socio-economic rights are all those that might be subject to
violations of their right. In principle, socio-economic rights are granted in the
interest of "everyone?". In reality, however, most of these rights protect those
who are without jobs, who live in the midst of poverty, with nothing to protect
themselves from powerful rains and the wars of the sun. They protect those
who have no voice to influence corrupt officials in their decision making. Here,
the practical extent of protection is wider in the case of some socio-economic
rights than others. For instance, the right to education protects a wider portion
of society tha the right to food. All in all, socio-economic rights are meant to
give a guarantee of life to the least fortunate, the poor, the homeless, the
voiceless etc.
In conclusion, the fact that these rights are at the center of good governance
makes them worth respecting and protecting. That is why most international
human rights instruments have included these rights in the realm of their
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protection. More over, a number of national constitutions, including the FDRE
constitution'", have included enforceable socio-economic rights. Some
constitutions have included them not as enforceable fundamental rights but as
fundamental "guiding principles" of state policy and programs. The Ethiopian
constitution follows both approaches. That is why every government, at least,
declares its commitment to provide the conditions for individuals to achieve
social and economic well-being.
2. Socio-Economic Rights. Real Rights?
2.1. Indivisibility and Equality of Rights
The human rights system forms a single whole. It is nowadays well settled
that human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and
interdependent and that equal attention and urgent consideration should be
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of both civil and
political, and ESC rights.'! This claim of interdependence, indivisibility and
interrelation between the two sets of rights has been given emphasis since the
adoption of the two major international covenants, the ICCPR and ICESCR i I
1966. t ~3~~~l ell
Indivisibility means that no single right can be properly enjoyed without the
other. Human rights spell out the bare minimum conditions of dignity and that
these minimum conditions include both categories of rights. Indivisibility
implies that the violation of one set of rights may result from a violation of the
other set of rights. This principle provides that human rights could not be
clearly divided into different categories, nor could they be so classified as to
represents a hierarchy of values. Both groups of rights constitute an
indissoluble whole, up on which the recognition of the dignity of the human
individual is based. All rights should be protected and promoted at the same
time, Without ESC rights civil and political rights might be purely nominal in
character; without civil and political rights, ESC rights could not be ensured.'?
The two sets of rights can neither logically nor practically be spotted in an
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entirely watertight compartments':'. Human rights, generally speaking, function
to restrain the powerful in order to protect the vital interests of the vulnerable
from abusive uses of political, economic and other forms of power.
Another form of indivisibility would be interpreting civil and political rights as
including ESe rights. The process of protecting socio- economic rights through
civil and political rights is called the integrated approach. The right to life, for
instance, can be interpreted to include the basic necessities of life such as
adequate nutrition, clothing, reading facilities, the right to livelihood, the right
to shelter, the right to health care and the right toIeducation 14.
The claim that the contemporary canon of human rights forms an indivisible
and interdependent system of norms is now well settled. Hence, it is improper
for governments to pick and choose among human rights those which they will
honor while ignoring other rights as optional, dispensable, non-obligatory or
even sometimes as "unreal". There is a lot of evidence to support this view.
There is a proposition that ESe rights are not really law or alternatively, without
denying the legal character of ESe rights, it may be alleged that the differences
between civil and political rights and ESe rights are so great that the latter are
considered second rate human rights". This view is nowadays considered
obsolete and artificial and only a mechanism by which tyrants and oppressors
could simply employ a technique of repression to maintain their system of
oppression. It is true that ESe rights have severe budgetary implication. But
whether or not an entitlement is a right does not depend on its resource
implications. Human rights are intended to achieve the goal of ridding the
world of oppression. But it is only through the system of human rights that we
can fight systems of oppression. And this requires recognizing the
interrelation, interdependence and indivisible nature of all human rights, civil
and political as well as ESe rights.
6
The recognition of the interdependence and interrelation of human rights
started long ago when the UN General Assembly agreed to draft two separate
covenants containing the two sets of rights in 1951.16 Despite the decision to
hayttwo covenant) all the members agreed that:
"The enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of Ese rights are
interconnected and interdependent and that when deprived of Ese
rights man does not represent the human person whom the universal
declaration regards as the ideal of free man"
The decision to have two covenants was a result of the divergence in opinion
which arose from a difference in approach rather than of purpose 17. Hence, it
does not underestimate/ undermine the claim of interplay.
Since the adoption of the two covenants, the lCCPR and the lCESCR, a number
of documents and factors support and prove the interdependence and
indivisibility of the two sets of rights. Among these are the Tehran
Proclamation 18, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 19.
A lot other factors also support the claim of indivisibility. The extent to which
newer human rights conventions contain both categories of rights provides an
indication of their indivisibility.i'' Most of the core universal human rights
treaties such as the Convention of the Eradication of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination /CERD/, Convention on the Elimination of All forms of
Discrimination Against Women/ CEDAW/, Convention of the Rights of the
Child/CRC/ and others include both sets of rights. Moreover, the adoption of
regional declarations and conventions that contain references to or are
exclusively concerned with socio-economic rights is further support for belief
that a world wide consensus of what constitutes the common denominators of
dignity includes social and economic rights.
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The Vienna declaration and program of action states that "all human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated." This claim is
further supported by the General Assembly Resolution which asserts that:
A) All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of both civil
and political, and Ese rights;
B) The full realization of civil and political rights without the
enjoyment of Ese rights is impossible; the achievement of lasting
progress in the implementation of human rights is dependant up on
sound and effective national and international policies of economic
and social development. 21
The question of interdependence and interrelation has also gained expression
in the preambles of a number of international and regional conventions. The
rCESCR, for instance, declares that the enjoyment of both ESC rights and civil
and political rights is an indispensable precondition for building a system in
which the ideal of free man enjoys freedom from fear and want 22. The African
Charter also puts this idea in a plain language. It declares that the member
states take cognizance of the fact that:
civil and political rights can not be dissociated from Ese rights in
their conception as universality and that the satisfaction of Ese rights
is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights 23.
At the national level also, socio-economic rights are gaining more and more
recognition. Some have indeed included legally enforceable socio-economic
rights with in their lists of fundamental rights. South Africa, Thailand and
Ethiopia provide good examples.
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All the above facts combine to make me fearless to declare that the human
rights system forms an indivisible whole whereby the world should give them
equal protection and enforcement thereby giving the system a strong,
unshakable base. Indivisibility essentially means applying a holistic right based
approach to activities aiming to protect and promote human rights, civil and
political and ESCrights. In deed, this proves why socio-economic right are real
rights.
The clear implication of the recognition of the interplay and indivisibility of
human rights, and the legal status of socio-economic rights is the equality of
rights. In human rights law, all entitlements considered rights are equal and
there is no hierarchy of rights. Indivisibility necessarily rejects the existence of
hierarchy. The violation of one right cannot be justified by the respect for
another. Respect for one does not justify sacrifice of the other. All need to be
protected.
In conclusion, human rights form a system of norms which function to protect
human dignity by thwarting systems of oppression. Though they have
individual and particular justifications in themselves, they form a unity. Thanks
to the words of the Committee on the ICESCRand the two influential expert
meetings conducted in Maastricht 24, the content of the ESC rights has been
elaborated. Hence, the status of socio-economic rights as human rights is now
settled. Though different conceptions of human rights may downplay their
importance, it is no more disputed that modern human rights law include
economic and social rights 25. At least in formal terms, for the purpose of
human rights law, debate over whether socio-economic rights are real rights is
settled, whatever the dispute over their nature and consequences. That is why
the ICESCR"uses the language of rights, not merely hope, of undertakings and
commitment by governments, not merely aspirations and goals"."
9
3) Obligations imposed by socio-Economic rights/ICESCR/
The most comprehensive document on ESCrights is the ICESCRthough they are
sprinkled here and there in various human rights instruments. Whenever a
state ratifies a covenant, it undertakes to implement the obligations set out in
it. The source of the obligation may be either international treaties or the
national constitution. The guide used here is the ICESCR. It must be noted that
what ever the source, the obligations are similar as they flow from the nature of
the rights.
In this regard, Article 2(1) of the ICESCRis of a pioneer relevance. It is the main
component of the covenant in that it identifies the kinds of obligations the
states parties recognize to fulfill. It also sets forth the steps the governments
must take in order to realize each substantive right. This article sets out:
Each state party to the present covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and cooperation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
As can be seen from the formulation of this article, socio-economic rights
impose obligations which are progressive and qualified. They are progressive in
the sense that they are to be achieved gradually, through time. Since they have
serious resource implications, they cannot be fulfilled over night, they need
time and resource to fully realize. The obligations are qualified in that the
resource and wealth of a particular state party determines the extent of its
obligations under the covenant. The obligations are not invariable to all states.
This is why socio-economic rights are seen as different from civil and political
rights. The latter are to be fulfilled immediately and are not resource
dependant as such. They have insignificant resource or budgetary implications.
In deed, Article 2(1) of the ICCPR imposes the duty to "respect and ensure" the
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rights set forth in the covenant. The ICESCRrequires states parties the to "take
steps ... to the maximum of available resources" to realize their obligations.
Many people argue that this wording of the covenant makes the rights under
the ICESCR so vague that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to tell when the
rights have been violated. 27 This vagueness claim with their serious resource
implication, has been a major source of controversy in the international as well
as domestic arena as to the exact legal position of socio-economic rights. But
nowadays, thanks to the Committee on ESC rights and the works of many
academics, their devotion and restless efforts has demonstrated that this kind
of obligation is meaningful and that violations of such obligations can be
identified. Moreover, the active role courts are playing in the enforcement of
socio-economic rights provides abundant evidence of the possibility of
identifying violations and rectifying them.
The following parts deal with and examine the conceptual framework implied
in the ICESCRfor discussing the government's obligations. It also explains how
one 111ayaddress specific kinds of obligations.
3.1 Obligations of conduct and Result.
An obligation of conduct exists where a government must behave in a
particular way, but not commit itself to achieving any substantive result. 28 It
only requires action reasonably calculated to realize the enjoyment of a
particular right. For example, in the right to be free from torture, the
government commits itself to order its laws and practices such that it never
tortures any individual while carrying on its activities. This obligation is one of
conduct. The obligation of result requires states to achieve specific targets to
satisfy a detailed substantive result." Jeff King defines the obligation of result
as one that commits the government to raising particular state of affairs, but
leaves the government with the discretion to adopt its own means of achieving
it.3o With respect to the right to health, for example, the obligation of result
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requires the reduction of maternal mortality to a low level (defined level) It may
also be to reduce morbidity rate as a result of a particular diseases, say malaria,
to a desired level.
In 1977, the International Law Commission jlLCj declared that the obligations
arising under the ICESCRwere obligations of result, and not of conduct. This
rigid view i~how ever, rejected nowadays. There is also a tendency to consider
civil and political rights as obligations of conduct. But if we see the example
with respect to torture, while the government has an obligation of conduct to
abstain from the use of torture, it is equally the case that it COITll11itSto
"prevent" the use of torture within its territory. Put simply it, commits to
eradicate torture. Like wise, with respect to health there is a conduct
dimension. For instance, health services must be provided in a non-
discriminatory basis and to everyone. The failure may be viewed as the non
fulfillment of an obligation of conduct 31. In fact, it is only through conduct that
one achieves any result. That is, all obligations of result always imply some
kind of conduct on the actor.
All in all, it should be understood that the tendency to conceive the ICCPR as
imposing exclusively of conduct and the ICESCR as imposing exclusively
obligations of result is untenable. It is only a baseless attempt to destruct the
claim that the contemporary canon of human rights forms an indivisible and
interdependent system. The interplay between the human rights system is not
undermined by such rigid) extreme classifications. A better way of
understanding the obligations imposed by the ICESER and all other human
rights instruments is exammed next.
3.2 Obligations to respect, protect, fulfill.
ow a days, it is universally accepted that socio-economic rights, just as all
other human rights do, impose three types or levels of obligations: that is the
obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill. Each of the obligations has its
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own implications. But what is common to all is that.f'atlure to perform anyone
of these obligations constitutes a violation of the entitlements.
The obligation to respect /Negative Obligations/
The obligation to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with the
enjoyment of Ese rights 32. It is one of restrain Any active encroachment upon
these rights is, therefore, a violation. This corresponds closely to the traditional
conservative view which argues that the obligation of the state is to abstain
from arbitrary intervention 0(\ the freedom and autonomy of the individual.
This provides a shield for citizens from unjust interferences by political
authorities. This obligation is violated by proactive measures taken by the
government. States must respect, for instance, the resources owned by an
individual and the individuals freedom to find work. The govermnent should
not engage in arbitrary forced evictions. Banning of trade unions is also another
example of violation of the state's duty to respect. Many commentators feel
that civil and political rights are exclusively concerned with the obligation to
respect 33. But it should be noted that both categories of rights have this
negative dimension in the sense that they require the state to respect the
autonomy of the individual in the exercise of his/her rights.
The obligation to protect
This obligation requires states to prevent violations of socio-economic rights by
third parties. Governments must prevent third parties from infringing the
socioeconomic rights of others. This obligation disapproves the stop and
watch policies of governments. Here, the state is required to take positive steps
towards the effective enjoyment of rights. It presupposes a proactive
government. This includes the obligation to enact legislation and create the
framework to enjoy the rights without interference from others. Thus,
governments have to enact a set of minimum standards for the working
conditions in order to prevent third parties from violating human rights. It
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gives an extra task more than mere restrain. The role of democratic human
rights legislations designed to prevent private actors and human rights
commissions charged with administering and ~Ji~such legislation should
be emphasized here.
Individual's rights should not be infringed by private non state actors such as
corporations, land lords etc. Thus, the failure to ensure that private employers
comply with basic labor standard may amount to a violation of the right to
work or the right to just and favorable conditions of work 34. The enacting of
legislations regulating the amount of rent is in compliance with this obligation.
It also includes protection against marketing of hazardous products by means,
inter alia, of legislation. The obligation to protect assimilates the acts of private
actors in to the state and it is violated by neutrality or omission of the state.
The obligation to fulfill
This obligation requires the state to take positive steps to ensure the
realization of the right in question which may include" legislative,
administration, judicial, budgetary and other measures35 General Comments
No. 12 and 13 define the obligation to fulfill to include the obligation to
facilitate and provide, while General Comment NO.14 includes the obligation to
promote as part of the obligation to fulfill 36. The state has the obligation to
fulfill by positively intervening and assisting, especially those who are in a
vulnerable position, to make better use of their rights.
Under this obligation, the government must provide food, shelter, health,
education or other necessities of life to individuals without the means to
provide for them selves to the maximum possible. Extension of social
assistance, public health care and public education forms part of this
obligation. It can be easily discerned that the obligation to fulfill has serious
resource implications and bears upon government policies and programs. The
violation of this obligation includes the failure of states to provide essential
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primary health care to those in need. Only by omission can a state infringe
these obligations. Similar to the obligation to protect, this obligation
presupposes an active, intervening government. The existence of this kind of
obligation in socio-economic rights has made these rights a very controversial
bit in modern day jurisprudence. The non- justiciability claim has, for instance,
its prtmary base in this obligation 37.
In conclusion, it must be noted that all human rights need to be respected,
protected and fulfilled. The view that socio-economic rights are exclusively
concerned with the obligation to fulfill while civil and political rights involve
the obligations to respect only is obsolete and has been criticized by scholars
who have indicated the extensive range of obligations to protect and fulfill civil
and political rights as well as the obligations to respect and protect in socio-
economic rights 38. The involvement of the obligations to protect and respect in
socio-economic rights is proved above beyond doubt. To prove the othg if we
take the right to protection against torture, for instance, the state may be
required to train the police, militia, prison officers and other officials not to
engage in such acts. The state will also be required not to let a private actor to
torture his fellow individual. Hence, this artificial method of classifying rights
as '" freedom from" and "freedom to" should be rejected. (1
~:n3~~~2 rJl
4. The Government's obligations under the ICESCR.
Having discussed the general framework of the government's obligations lets
now turn to the specific obligations of the government. The fact that socio-
economic rights are to be implemented through time and that they are resource
dependant is, as mentioned before, a major source of controversy. Not few
believe that social rights are mere aspirations and without any judicially
enforceable content. That is, they assert that these rights are guidelines rather
than legal rights as such 39. The source of this view is the truth that these rights
impose positive obligations and are dependent on the resources available.
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This view is, however, becoming weaker and weaker as the Comnuttee on ESC
rights and many legal academics have given the admittedly general wording of
the covenant an interpretation which clarifies the legal obligations that may be
applied with consistency and in predictable ways. As will be seen in the next
chapters, many domestic and international courts are developing jurisprudence
disapproving the obsolete and artificial view that socio-economic rights are not
legal rights.
4.1. Progressive and qualified obligations
The ICCPR under its art 2(1) provides that states are bound to " respect and
ensure" the rights enshrined in it. This is different from the obligation imposed
by its counter part in the ICESCR. The ICCPR imposes immediate obligations
that are unqualified by the economic capacity of states. Where as the ICESCR
imposes progressive and qualified obligations. The ICESCRsets out that states
parties are required to " take steps to the maximum of the available
resources ...with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in it 40. The essence of the legal obligations incurred by any
government in this area is to strive to attain the economic and social
aspirations of its people, by following an order that assigns priority to the basic
human needs.
A progressive obligation is one the full implementation of which requires time.
The time needed in fact differs for different countries depending on their
economic strength. In this case, it is unrealistic to require immediate
compliance with all rights, given the nature of these rights and the specific
problems each state must deal with to ensure their full enjoyment. The
obligations are qualified in the sense that a state is required to use only the
maximum of its available resources. Failure to fulfill due to inability (lack of
resources) does not constitute a violation. It is very important to distinguish
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between inability and unwillingness to use the materials at hand. The
progressive nature of the obligations is in fact the result of their qualified
nature. It is clear that the infrastructure necessary to implement all of the
rights in the covenant can not be established overnight. The Committee
declared with respect to the right to health that:
For millions of people throughout the world the full enjoyment of the
right to health still remains a distant goal. 41
This is true even for the most developed countries of the world.
The fact that these obligations are to be fulfilled through time ha~howeve.sled
some to believe that these obligations have no meaningful content and hence
lose their legal nature. This is, however, not true. It should also be noted that
states cannot lag behind their potential to delay the implementation of the
right indefinitely. It is only a mechanism of creating the necessary flexibility
which takes into account the practical realities of different states parties. All
states cannot reach the same level at the same time. There are formidable
structural and other obstacles resulting from international and other factors
which have severe impacts on each state. The Committee has addressed the
issue of progressiveness in a detail way. General Comment No.3 provides that:
The fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is
foreseen under the covenant should not be misinterpreted as
depriving the obligations of all meaningful content. It is on the one
hand a necessary flexibility device, reflective the realities of the real
world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full
realization of Ese rights 42.
Hence, the obligation to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights
requires states parties to move as expeditionary as possible towards the
realization of the rights'", It should never be interpreted as providing an
opportunity for states to defer efforts designed to fully realize the rights. It is
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important to, therefore, note that states parties have the obligation to begin to
take steps to fulfill their obligations under the covenant immediately.
The progressive nature of the obligations under the covenant may be
interpreted in the following way. The government must take steps that are :-
a) a necessary stage of a long term plan
b) a substantial contribution/i.e. not of eligible impact/
c) clearly targeted and
d) expeditious / i.e. they should not take an unreasonably long time
to effect results4t Showing that a government programme does not meet these
criteria means, it is in non-compliance with its progressive obligations. The
obligation of progressive achievement exists independently of the increase in
resources. It only requires the effective use of resources available. Before taking
any measure~ the government must consider the pros and cons of each of the
possibilities at hand. By showing that the government failed to create a
coherent strategy, misspent funds or acted in bad faith when implementing the
supposed remedial programme, we can prove that the government failed to
protect and fulfill the rights concerned". "Available resources" includes both
resources within a state and those available from the international community
through international cooperation and assistance.
4.2 Immediate Obligations
Even though the full realization of the rights needs time and resources, it does
not mean that there are no obligations that are capable of being implemented
immediately. Some obligations under the covenant require immediate
implementation in full by all states parties such as the obligations of
prohibiting discrimination in tmplementing covenant rights under article 2(2).
In fact there is no clear dividing line between progressive and immediate
obhgations'". The duty to start implementing the progressive obligations
immediately creates a sub-obligation that are of an immediate nature.
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The difference between the two kinds of obligations lies in the answer to the
question when should they be fulfilled. All of the elements in a specific
immediate obligation must be realized at once and as a matter of priority. In
the case of progressive obligations the state party is only required to go where
its pocket allows it to. In the former, delay is a violation but in the latter it is
implied in so far as it is reasonable in the sense that the available resources are
used in the best possible way. Governments cannot justify the non-
implementation of an immediate obligation unless there are extra ordinary
circumstances, Hence, since such obligations are not resource dependent,
resource constraints are not a factor or excuse in this case. If any of the
elements of an immediate obligation are not present within a reasonably short
time, the government is in automatic non-compliance. It is for this reason that
immediate obligations must be defined precisely.
The existence of obligations which require immediate implementation is
witnessed by the Committee. The following are immediate obligations related to
the right to housing as the Committee recognized under General Comment
No.4:
a) To adopt a national housing strategy /Para.12/
b) To monitor the situation with respect to the right be housing
/Para 13/
c) To refrain from action that would obstruct access to housing
d) To facilitate self help
e) To seek international assistance if immediate obligations
appear to be beyond the states financial capacity/para 10/
f) To ensure that evictions are carried out in accordance with duly
enacted laws and include resettlement or compensations.
All in all, it can be said that the duties to respect and protect impose immediate
obligations on states. But most of the time, the duty to fulfill requires time and
hence are progressive.
19
4.3. Core Obligations
The concept of core obligations is a relatively new, modern one. It is based on
the idea that at least the minimum levels of each of the obligations should be
fulfilled. The Committee developed the jurisprudence on core obligations
mainly because most of the states parties were trying to avoid the
implementation of socio- economic rights under the pretext that these rights
are progressive and hence vague to define their content.
In response to this unacceptable trend followed by states, the Committee
developed two answers on this point. First, the Committee has made it clear
that progressive obligations impose the duty to start immediately and to move
as expeditiously as possible to reach the end though far. Having proved the
insufficiency of this robust interpretation of "Progressive obligations" to deal
with the problem, the Committee confirmed the idea that the state has an
utmost obligation to protect and fulfill the minimum essential levels of each of
the rights 47. The duty to ensure respect for the minimum subsistence rights for
all is imposed on states regardless of the level of economic development".
With respect to the concept of core obligations, the Committee has outlined the
obligations of states in an understandable way. It declared that:
"The committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels
of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party"."
The clear implication of the above comment is that, violations of the covenant
occur when a state fails to satisfy what the committee referred to as 'minimum
core obligations'. Thus, for example, a state party in which any significant
number of individuals is deprived of essential food stuffs, of essential primary
health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of
education is, prima facie, violating the covenant. 50
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The only possible defense available for a state party failing to fulfill these core
obligations is to show that the best methods were used to exploit what is at
hand in the most effective way to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those
minimum obligations. Except in such situations, failure to fulfill the core
obligations is a violation irrespective of the availability of resources of the
country concerned or any other factors and difficulties!'. It thus creates a
presumption of guilt independent of resource considerations. This has two
implications. First, it shifts the burden of proof of violation to the state. Failure
to provide the minimum essential levels of each of the rights puts such a state
on the line of violators. Hence, the state has to prove that it has made all
efforts to reach those minimum levels. The second significance is an
implication of the first. Core obligations put a heightened responsibility to care
for these rights. The more intense the states obligation to protect and fulfill
the rights, the less option to the states discretion in choosing the means of
implementation. It should be noted that states parties enjoy a margin of
discretion in selecting the best road to the full realization of the right.
In conclusion, failure to demonstrate that "every effort" was made to
implement these rights (the minimum levels of each of the rights) is a violation
of the covenant. Hence, showing that the government did either nothing, very
little, or ignored plausible options shows that it did not make every effort as
required and hence is in violation of its duties.
4.4 International Obligations
This part deals with the obligations imposed on states parties on the respect,
protection and fulfillment of socio-economic rights of people in other
countries. The root of this obligation is art 2 (1) which requires states to take
steps, individually and through international cooperation to realize the right.
This obligation, inter alia, requires state to refrain from actions that interfere
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directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the rights of people in other
countries. Examples would include harmful embargoes and conclusion of
damaging international trade agreements or debt service conditions. \rVith
respect to the right to health the Committee declared that.
"States parties should refrain at all times from imposing embargoes
or similar measures restricting the supply of another state with
adequate medicines and medical equipment. Restriction on such
goods should never be used as an instrument of political and
economic pressure" 52.
A similar precaution is given by the Committee with respect to the right to
water 53.
International cooperation and assistance aimed at the realization of the rights
contained in the covenant is crucial and must be one based on the sovereign
equality of states. Such cooperation are encouraged, and in fact ordered, by the
Charter of the United Nations." and the ICESCR. According to the Limburg
Principles such cooperation and assistance shall have in view as a matter of
priority the realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, ESC as
well as civil and political 55. It may also be argued that states parties have an
obligation to seek international assistance for the fulfillment of a right when
they do not have sufficient resources to fulfill it.
This obligation also implies that no state should allow individuals in their
territory to engage in activities that violate or might violate the socio-economic
rights of people in other countries. Under General Comment No. 14, the
Committee recognized that states parties have to respect the enjoyment of the
right to health in other countries and to protect people in other countries by
influencing third parties which are engaged in violation of rights through legal
or political means, 56
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With respect to the right to water, General Comment No. 15 provides that each
state party should take steps to prevent their own citizens and companies from
violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries.V
Moreover, states are further called up on to ensure that their actions as
members of international organizations respect and fulfill covenant rights 58. In
this respect, the Maastricht Guidelines provide that member states of such
organizations have the duty to make sure that their policies and programs take
into account issues of ESC rights especially when these policies and programs
are implemented in countries that lack the resources to resist the pressure
brought by international originations on their decision malting affecting ESC
rights 59. It is crucial to note that cooperation and assistance must be extended
irrespective of differences in political, economic and social systems.
A very controversial area in this respect is whether there is an international
obligation to provide aid. The Committee did not give a clear answer to this
question, But in General Comment No. 15, the Committee says that where
resources are available states" ... shall facilitate realization of the right to water
in other countries ,,60 In General Comment No. 14, the Committee 'writes
that
"States parties have a joint and individual responsibility ... to cooperate in
providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of
emergency, including assistance to refugees and displaced persons" 61
It must, however, be noted that during the drafting of art 2(1), the idea that
states can claim assistance as a matter of legal right was rejected by general
consensus 62. Jeff King suggests that the Committee is not bound by the
drafter's intent though it is relevant. He does not, however, specify his position
in this respect.
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All in all, states are not free to do nothing; they should work hard for the
promotion, respect, protection and fulfillment of socio- economic rights both in
their territory as well as in the territories of other fellow states parties. Only
then can we achieve the sacred purpose of giving human dignity a real meaning
and making life livable.
4.5. Violations
International human rights instruments, and all treaties in general, impose
obligations on states which have ratified them as required by the treaty itself.
The result of this is that, any act inconsistent with the treaty undertakings of
such a state are considered violations. Failure to do any act which a state is
required to perform, or doing something disapproved by the treaty constitute a
violation and hence lead to a judicial action at the international, and sometimes
at the domestic levels if such duties are made part of the municipal laws of
such a state. Violation is the act of breaking, infringing or transgressing the law.
Having said this, we will now see the possible acts which are considered as
violations of the rights enshrined under the ICESCR. It must be noted that any
act inconsistent with the obligations previously established is contrary to the
law. The obligations of states are classified into three as explained before the
obligation to respect, protect and fulfill. If any of these duties is not
implemented a violation occurs. A failure to comply with an obligation
contained in the covenant is, under international law a violation of such
covenant. A violation can happen through acts of commission as well as acts of
omission. Hence, a failure to avoid promptly obstacles which a state is under a
duty to remove to permit the immediate fulfillment of a right amounts to a
violation 63. Also any act of interference with the rights of the covenant not
allowed by it are all violations. The failure to reform or repel legislation which
is manifestly inconsistent with an obligation of the covenant is an instance of a
violation.
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Violations of a right can occur through the direct action of states or other
entities insufficiently regulated by states. The adoption of any retrogressive
measures incompatible with the obligation also constitutes a violation. It may
also result from the omission or failure of states to take necessary measures
stemming from legal obligations. It must also be noted that a violation occurs
when a state fails to fulfill the minimum core obligations of any given right. On
the right to food, for instance, General Comment No. 12 States that "Violation
of the covenant occurs when a state fails to ensure the satisfaction of, at the
very least, the minimum essential level required to be free from hunger" 64. All
in all, a violation of ESC right occur when a state pursues, by action or
omission, a policy or practice which deliberately contravenes or ignores the
obligations of the covenant or fails to achieve the required standards of
conduct or result 65.
In conclusion, in determining what amounts to failure to comply with a states
obligations under the covenant, it is important to be careful not to confuse
inability from refusal or unwillingness of a state to comply with its treaty
obligations A state might fail for reasons beyond its capacity to control. Such a
state cannot be said to have violated its duty under the covenant. It is against
the requirement of Article 2(1) which imposes a qualified duty dependant on
the resources at hand. Therefore, whether there is a failure to comply, or a
violation, must be seen in the light of the states parties right or margin of
discretion in choosing the means of carrying out its obligations, and that
factors beyond its reasonable control may adversely affect its capacity to
implement particular rights.
4.6. Retrogressive Measures
One way by which states violate their duty under the covenant is by taking
retrogressive measures. A retrogressive measure is any action or measure taken
by the govermnent which results in the removal or rolling back of legislation or
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institution previously used to safeguard a right." Retrogressive measures are
special forms of violations. They require positive acts on the part of the
government. States parties have the duty to respect the rights guaranteed under
the covenant. Hence they cannot legally engage in acts that interfere with such
rights. But retrogressive measures are clearly acts of interference that create a
hindrance in the full realization of each of the rights. States parties can not act
in such a way that demolishes an established protective shield. States are
prohibited from adopting policies, measures and laws that worsen the situation
of socio-economic rights that the population currently enjoys.
Retrogressive measures, example social cutbacks, might result from the
attempt to live up to the conditions attached to loan and trading agreements.
Since they have the effect of bringing down all previously taken positive
measures, emphasis should be given to such serious acts of violations. That is
why, the adoption of any deliberate retrogressive measures that reduces the
extent to which any right is guaranteed is considered a violation." States are
required to n10ve for ward and not to pull the right back.
Be it as it may, sometimes a steady move to the full realization of socio-
economic rights might require the deliberate taking of such measures. But it
should be taken only as a last resort and only after due consideration of the
advancing and degrading effect of such a measure. The Committee dealt with
this issue under General Comment No.3. The rule is no retrogressive measures.
But if any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the state party has the
burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful
consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified by reference to
the totality of the rights provided for in the covenant in the context of the full
use of the state party's maximum available resources."
The implication is clearly stated in this verse. Any state which has introduced a
retrogressive measure is considered guilty or a violator unless proved
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otherwise. This shifts the burden of proof from the Committee (or any redress
seeking person) to the state. This is similar to the effect of non-compliance with
the duty to provide the minimum core obligations. There fore, any state which
tends to introduce any retrogressive measures has the burden of showing that:
1) they were introduced after the most careful consideration of all
the possible alternatives:
2) The measure is justified by reference to the totality of the rights
guaranteed in the covenant, and
3) Must be reflective of the most effective, optimal use of all the
available resources.
In conclusion, states must decline from taking actions that distort the over all
structure build for the respect, protection and fulfillment of socio-economic
rights. It is only when a better goal can be served that states are permitted to
take such measures. In such cases it might even be considered advisable.
4.7. Mechanisms of implementing the rights
Once a right is guaranteed, the next logical step will be to assess the means that
will help realize such rights. States are allowed to select the mechanism
best suited to their respective circumstances. The ICESCRstates that the rights
enshrined there in are to be fulfilled" by all appropriate means". This phrase
must be given its full and natural meaning. The steps that must be taken may
take different forms. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that the enjoyment of
human rights depend primarily on the state's domestic conduct. It is to be kept
in mind that only effective domestic protection can ensure the observance of
internationally recognized rights.
Now we will look into the possible choices available for states parties to use as
a means to implement the obligations they have undertaken under the
Covenant. Different authors usually subscribe specific categories that illustrate
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the kinds of things the government should do to implement socio-economic
rights. It must be understood that the list is no way exhaustive and states are
allowed to follow any mechanism they deem proper in the circumstances of
each case.
The first most important means is the enactment of legislations designed to
implement the rights. Such legislation is given particular importance and is
mentioned as an instance in the Covenant. Legislation is in fact the primary
means to incorporate international human rights into domestic law. This is
suggested to be the best way to give effect to such rights and greatly facilitates
the move to the full realization of socio-economic rights. Legislations may also
be adopted on new areas to guide the legal system in the direction compatible
with the covenant. Moreover, legislative action is the only way to deal with an
existing legislation which inconsistent with the obligations assumed under the
covenant. That is, there is a need for a repealing legislation in such cases.
Although legislation is the basic for the effective use of the other mechanisms,
it is far from being the only measure to fulfill the obligations.
The second most important means is administrative measures. The government
is the one that gives effect to and executes the laws made by the legislator.
Administrative organs must be structured in such a way that respects and
protects the rights under the Covenant. The government should make sure that
social security agencies, hospitals, agricultural bureau and regulatory
commissions respect the rights when they deal with people. These and other
administrative bodies 111UStwork together with the legislator and the judiciary
to 1110vein the desired direction.
The provision of judicial remedies is another most pressing aspect of "the
appropriate means" criteria. A judicial remedy is provided when a complainant
brings an action to ensure that his or her right is respected, protected and / or
fulfilled by the government. The provision of judicial remedies to violations of
rights as one of the measures considered appropriate is recognized by the
28
Committee. 69. Judicial recourse to seek redress for violations of a right is a
natural aspect of all rights. Domestic protection can not be assured without the
judiciary which is the ultimate guarantor of rights. The judicial process is a
method for enabling citizens to challenge state agencies regarding government
policies. If the legislator and the administrative organs are primarily
responsible for the fulfillment of the rights, courts are the right organs to
watch out the tasks performed by the first two.
Once a case is brought before a court the remedies it orders may take different
forms, Restricting the government from interfering with a right is one. This is
called injunction in the legal term and is one of the commonest remedies
granted by courts in various instances. Sometimes the court may order specific
performance against the government for its failure to protect and fulfill its
duties. The awarding of monetary compensation (damages) or the giving of a
symbolic declaration that a right has been violated (declaration) are the other
forms. It must be noted that the court is not excluded from granting one or
more of the remedies at once. Other orders may be given in the interim.
The fourth means that can be exploited is the introduction of economic
measures, The adoption of economic policies, such as exchange rates, minimum
wage provisions and protection in trading agreements and privatization of
public services are some of the measures 70. Regulation of tuition fees also falls
in this category. In fact all of these measures need the involvement of either the
legislator or the concerned administrative organs or both.
The use of social and educational measures also falls within the ambit of the"
appropriate means" phrase. Jeff King suggests that the adoption of public
holidays, funding community centers and support for civil society organization,
for instance, fall within the social mechanisms that can help implement socio-
economic rights in full. The launching of operations designed to help people
become aware of and demand their rights is also relevant. Public education,
education of children, legal literacy of workers etc all form part of the
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educational measures that could be used to achieve the full realization of the
rights.
In conclusion, the obligation to fulfill requires states to take appropriate
legislative, administrative, judicial, economic, budgetary, social, educational and
other measures geared towards the achievement of the objectives of the
Covenant. It is crucial to note that legislative measures are crucial behind each
of the measures that could be exploited by states parties. It is clear, however,
that neither legislation nor effective remedies of a primarily judicial nature will
per se be sufficient in the full realization of socio-economic rights. It is only the
combination of each of the suggested measures that can produce the best
results.
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Chapter II
Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights
4.4. Definition
The issue whether courts have the power to adjudicate on matters of socio-
economic rights has raised an endless debate. We can call it the justiciability
debate. By justiciability it normally means two things. First, the ability of a
court to apply a certain law to a certain situation. Secondly, the right of a
person or entity to request that the court make such a ruling. The term
"justiciability" is generally understood to refer to a rights faculty to be
subjected to the scrutiny of a court of law or another quasi-judicial entity. A
right is said to be justiciable when a judge can consider this right in a concrete
set of circumstances and when this consideration can result in the further
determination of this right's significance 1. By justiciability it means a process
by which a complaint can be launched against state non-compliance with rights
in courts.
An issue is justiciable when a court is the capable and legitimate institution for
resolving it 2. If a matter can be argued in a courtroom and if such a court can
give a ren1edYjthen such a matter is justiciable. A complainant can bring an
action to ensure that his or her right is respected, protected and fulfilled by the
government only if the right in concern is justiciable. Justiciability concerns a
court determining whether compliance with a law or convention has taken
place. The presence of this character in rights entitles beneficiaries to have
recourse to judicial bodies in case they think their rights are violated. If a right
is not justiciable.it means that it is not capable of being invoked in courts and
applied by judges. Justiciable matters are matters which can be appropriately
resolved by the courts 3. Something is justiciable if it is capable of being
brought within the legal framework with the possibility of being invoked by an
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individual or a group as a cause of action before the courts leading to possible
measures of enforcement or the provisions of remedies. When a right is
justiciable.it is capable of being decided by a court of justice based on legal
principles. If courts can apply their interpretative mind on a matter then it is
justiciable.
The question of whether socio-economic rights are justiciable has historically
been one of the least clearly understood and hotly debated issues in the
literature of rights. The central concerns in deciding whether what rights are
appropriate for judicial deliberation can be found in the cores of all
justiciabilit doctrines.
1) The concern for judicial economy, efficiency and effectiveness
2) The concern for disputes being adequately argued in adversial
forum.
3) The concern not to immunize laws and govermnents actions from
judicial review, and
4) The concern not to deny worthy parties and issues, both present
and future, a proper judicial resolutiont.These concerns arise out
of two central principles which underlay the law of justiciability.
First, that courts not adjudicate cases beyond their institutional
capacity; and second that, courts not adjudicate cases beyond their
legitimacy to resolve disputes. The arguments on whether socio-
economic rights are justiciable always try, and of course should,
compromise the above central concerns underlying the principle of
justiciability. The under coming arguments will take in to account
these bases of the debate.
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2.2. Justiciability Vs Enforceability
It is now the right time to avoid any possible confusion between these two basic
elements of human rights law. Iusticiabilitv.as defined abov~entitles courts to
see into a particular law and declare whether a breach has occurred or not. On
the other hand, enforceability relates to the power of courts to order and force
the government to remedy such a violation. One author explained the
difference between the two concepts as:
Enforcement of human rights deals with the identification of the
entitlements and duties created by the legal regime which has to be
maintained and executed. Justiciability, on the other hand,
presupposes the existence of a review mechanism to determine non-
compliance with the terms of the legal regime. ,,5
The imphcation is that enforceability comes only after justiciability. That is,
enforceability presupposes justiciability. All in al~while justiciability concerns a
court determining whether compliance with a law or convention has taken
place, enforceability relates to the court's power or ability to grant remedies
and compel obedience to. 6 This distincti0ry.though might look technical, is very
important since there is a claim that in some jurisdictions, it may be possible to
establish that social rights are justiciable without going as far as claiming that
courts ought to be able to enforce all valid social claims. Although entertaining
a case while being reluctant to issue remedies has a problem, it also has the
merit of exposing violations and putting a pressure on the government to live
up to its commitments and maximum potemtial." But whenever possible,
courts should not hesitate to enforce a justiciable matter if they have to
continue as ultimate guarantors of human rights.
The issue of justiciability of socio-economic rights is, as mentioned before, a
very controversial bit. In fact, most courts around the world have been
reluctant to make rulings on socio-economic rights. This is attributable to the
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relatively underdevelopment of the jurisprudence on the sphere of these rights.
This has led to the violation of socio-economic rights without attracting global
attention in comparison with their civil and political rights counter parts. It is
true that there is a tendency to address aspects of human rights selectively and
to neglect socio-economic rights.
A determination of the issue of the justiciability of socio-economic rights is
very important as it stands at the soul of whether the rule of exhaustion of
local remedies has been met. According to this rule., a matter should first be
addressed by the national judicial or administrative body before it is brought
before international or regional courts or commissions." If we declare that they
are not justiciable, it means no local remedies are available in which case direct
action before international tribunals is permitted. But considering the fact that
there is no complaint mechanism to the committee, which depends on state
reports and its concluding observations, the decision that socio-economic
rights are not justiciable will leave them without meaning.
2.3. Proofs of justiciability of socio-economic rights
The fact that socio-economic rights enshrine the basic conditions of human
dignity is undisputed. They spell out the minimum elements of a dignified,
livable life. That is what we mean when we call them "human rights". The
question then is how to secure these souls of our lives. The arguments for
justiciability take different direction. Some of them stand by themselves to
prove that socio-economic rights are justiciable, while others disapprove
arguments which claim to assert that this is not the case. Vvewill see them turn-
by-turn.
The first reason to say that socio-economic rights are justiciable is based on
article 2(1) of the rCESCR. Under this provision" every ratifying state has
undertaken to implement the covenant rights "... by all appropriate means ... "•.
But as explained in chapter one, one of the specific means to be used in the
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implementation of these rights is the prOVlSIOnof judicial remedies. This is
warranted by the Committee which considers the provision of judicial remedies
as one of those deemed appropriate 9. In fact the committee has provided
illustrations of rights which should be considered justifiable without any
controversv.'? Moreover states have the duty to prove that domestic local
remedies are unnecessary. But in view of the Committee, this is very difficult, if
not impossible, to prove and that other mechanisms used will be meaningless
with out the reinforcement or complementary role of judicial remedies." Hence,
the assertion that socio-economic rights should have a place in courtrooms is a
sound one.Ihe presumption is the unfolding role of courts and it is for the state
to prove otherwise. Moreover, the right of everyone to an effective remedy is
also outlined under article 8 of the UDHR. This provision does not discriminate
between civil and political and socio-economic rights. The result is the justified
right of victims of violations to have a day in courtrooms.
The system of human rights provides mechanisms of dealing with the
inadequacies of the political forum." It is precisely about imposing
requirements upon government conduct. Hence, to suggest that it is only the
political forum that is capable of protecting socio-economic rights is
problematic. The political forum does not adequately protect rights. That is the
government is the obligation bearer. To say that it is the government that is
bound not to violate rights and at the same time it is responsible for ensuring
their implementation seems to be a paradox in terms. It is like becoming a
judge in a case concerning him/her.
The obligation bearer should not be the obligation enforcer. Otherwise, they will
be empty promises to be fulfilled at the mercy of government policies and
programmes rather than serious undertakings. Therefore, the involvement of a
different organ is a necessity if human rights are really to be respected,
protected and fulfilled. This means the judicial body is the reliable organ to
achieve the purpose of human rights. Judicial remedies are the natural recourse
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for violations of human rights. Human rights delineate a sphere of entitlements
that the government or the majority may not invade or disregard. Experience
supports the conclusion that the political forum is not a reliable organ for
protecting the rights. The very people these rights are most meant to protect,
including the impoverished, homeless, illiterate and exploited, are not properly
represented in the political arena.
The third argument starts with the assumption that the enjoyment of human
rights will depend primarily on the state's domestic conduct. Only effective
domestic protection can ensure the observance of internationally recognized
rightc.But domestic protection cannot be assured without the judiciary, which is
the ultimate guarantor of rights. Judicial recourses provide an effective means
of protecting social rights. Courts provide an effective and disciplined forum
for evaluating evidence, adjudicating adversarial claims, reviewing the
unforeseen consequences of policies and laws, giving an official audience to
claims about rights violations and more." It is through these procedures that
\r.e...
participation of the politically excluded canl\.taken seriously by the concerned
organs of the state. The courts power to order remedies allows people to stop
or compel government actions that affect their rights. It is this power above all
that makes judicial recourses the most appropriate avenue for defending socio-
economic rights.
The non-discrimination clause in the ICCPR and other human rights
instruments is also another base for the establishment of the justiciability of
socio-economic rights. The ICESCR also sets forth the obligation of states to
guarantee the exercise of the rights in the covenant without discrimination.
Under the lCCP!) the states obligation to prohibit discrimination does not refer
to any rights in particular, and therefore is applicable in relation to all rights
including socio-economic rights. This means that states are duty bdhd to
provide judicial remedies to cases of violation of socio-economic rights as a
result of discrumnation.
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The relevance of article 26 of the ICCPR as a possible avenue to the
justiciability of socio-economic rights was suggested by the human rights
Committee on civil and political rights. In Zwaan -de Vries v. the Netherlands,
the Committee decided that.
Although article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit
discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect
to matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus, it does not, for
example, require any state to enact legislation to provide social security.
However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a state's
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with article 26 of
the covenant.
The court found a violation of this provision with respect to the right to social
security based on marital status. This affirms an independent (self-standing)
right to prohibition against discrimination. This means that citizens are not to
be subjected to discrimination and any non-compliance can easily be subjected
to judicial scrutiny. The Committee on ESC rights has also confirmed that the
enjoyment of the rights recognized without discrimination will often be
appropriately promoted through the provision of judicial or other effective
remedies." Moreover, equality rights may create positive obligations to address
needs related to the disadvantaged and it may be breached by an omission or
failure to act to address the needs of those disadvantaged or vulnerable groups.
It exists not only to prevent discrimination by attribution of stereotypes, but
also to ameliorate the position of groups that have suffered disadvantage by
exclusion from mainstream society.
Another fact strengthening the judicial protection of social and economic rights
is the principle of indivisibility of rights. This also forms part of the integrated
approach. According to this principle. socio-economic rights can be accorded./
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protection by adopting a creative and robust interpretation of civil and political
rights such as the right to life. The positive obligation of states under the ICCPR
has been acknowledged by the human rights Committee established under this
covenant. The Committee has elaborated on the social dimensions of the right
to life in its two General Comments on article 6Y It declared that the "inherent
right to life" cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner and the
protection of this right requires that states should adopt positive measures.
This means states should not only retrain from taking lives intentionally but
they should also take appropriate measures to safeguard life. This requires
fulfilling socio-economic rights.
Hence-by a creative interpretation of rights that are recognized as justiciable,
the justiciability of socio-economic rights can be confirmed. By this means the
right to life can be interpreted by courts as proscribing acts destructive of the
environment, acts or omissions which impede the individuals access to food,
shelter and health care as each could lead to the denial of life under conditions
not permitted either by national or international human rights law.
In conclusion, it must be noted that claims of non-justiciability of socio-
economic rights seem not to have a strong base. The above reasons clearly
suggest that our answer to the role of the judiciary in enforcing socio-economic
rights must be in the affirmative. And this requires recognizing the fact that
courts are both competent and legitimate to rule on cases of violations of socio-
economic rights. It is time to take cognizance of the fact that the judiciary is
the ultimate guarantor and protector of socio-economic rights in particular and
all human rights in general. Without the involvement of the judiciary, the
domestic protection of social economic rights will be a dream, a remote one.
Justiciability must be seen as an expression of a right.
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2.4. Arguments against Justiciability and Responses to them
Despite the irresistibility of the reasons established to confirm the justiciability
of socio-economic rights, there has been a strong, and sometimes blind,
resistance to this claim. In fact the question of whether socio-economic rights
are justiciable has historically been one of the least clearly understood and
hotly debated issues in the literature of rights." That is why most courts
around the world have been reluctant to make rulings on socio-economic rights.
They have generally deferred this to the policy makers and politicians. They are
very hesitant to interfere with the role of those believed to be the rightful
decision makers in these matters. Courts usually are interested in civil and
political rights than socio-economic rights. That is reflected in other sections of
the government too. That is why the legal terrain of socio-economic rights is
not yet well established, despite recent encouraging developments.
This relative selectivity in respecting and protecting human rights has often
been criticized. In fact, it was declared in the world conference that:
2. The principle of equality of the two sets of rights has often
been more honored in the breach than in the observance.
5. The shocking reality .... is that states and the international
community as a whole continue to tolerate all too often breaches
of Ese rights which if they occurred in relation to civil and
political rights would provoke expressions of horror and outrage
and would lead to concerted calls for immediate remedial
actions."
This proves the fact that it is not a coincidence that many states have stood
against the idea of adopting a protocol to the ICESCRwhich is designed to
provide for individual complaint mechanisms. This is not a happenstance with
the prevailing secondary status accorded to these set of rights.
A considerable number of people, particularly in the west, including eminent
and influential international lawyers, still had views attributing a second rate
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status to socio-economic rights." Some even believe that these rights are not
'real' rights as such rather aspirations intended to serve as policy guidelines
and hence not capable of being invoked before national courts. But the main
objections to the justiciability of socio-economic rights seem to be more of
political rather than based on a true analysis of the nature and implications of
these rights. This is evidenced by the fact that the justiciability of socio-
economic rights is relative to the jurisdiction in question. This diversity shows
that the primary obstacles to the judicial review of these rights are not based 0
the intrinsic in-capacity or illegitimacy of the courts but rather of a heavily
political nature.'? The question of justiciability, therefore, is one of legal
creativity combined with political will.
But nowadays, thanks to the dedicated works of the Committee and prolific
acadermcians, there seems to be a shift in view. This is supported by recent
national and international developments. The idea that the burden to prove lies
on those who claim justiciable socio-economic rights no more echoes. The
contemporary view is the exact reverse. The universal acceptance of socio-
economic rights as forming part of the international code of human rights,
together with the committee's endless pressure and comments, suggest that the
burden of proof now lies upon those who oppose the justiciability claim.
Now it is time to deal with the common objections that endeavor to disapprove
the courts role in enforcing socio-economic rights. Each of the arguments is
followed by overruling responses, a disapproval for the disapproval. Before
going to the details, it is better to have a sketch of the arguments in brief. In
summary the reason can be seen to be:
1. Positive obligations are technically unsuitable for judicial
enforcement because courts lack the capacity to decide upon
complex policy matters.
2. The rights are very vague, and would amount to judicial legislation
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3. The rights are progressive, and thus there is an absence of an
enforceable core content.
4. Socio-economic rights would be a massive expansion of judicial
review. This would undermine the doctrine of the separation of
powers and would involve unelected judges deciding upon the
allocation of scarce resources."
5. To agree to such claim would amount to agreeing to provide, for
instance, expensive housing for the millions who claim that their
present house is not adequate. And this amounts to facing an
impossible challenge.
6. Judicial remedies are not effective in realising economic and social
rights. They are not the most effective means of achieving these
political goals.
Each of these arguments is dealt with below under two broad categories:
A) Arguments on institutional incapacity
B) Arguments on institutional illegitimacy
It must be understood, however, that each of the arguments is supplementary
to the other and are interrelated. Each flows from and is a necessary expression
of the other.
2.4.1. Institutional Incapacity
The arguments under this topic tend to establish that it is not possible for
courts to adjudicate on matters of socio-economic rights. Courts do not have
the institutional capacity to rule on these rights. All the arguments flow from
the predominantly positive nature of the obligations imposed by these rights.
i. The Unsuitability of Positive Obligations
Positive obligations require states to take proactive measures to live up to their
commitments, Negative obligations, on the other hand, require states to refrain
44
fr0111acting in a particular way. According to this argument courts have the
power to tell the state what the latter cannot do and "to ask them to judge the
extent to which a state shall act, rather than at what point it should not, is to
force an ill-advised institutional change up on them". 21 This is because the
enforcement of positive rights requires the courts to decide on what constitutes
satisfactory government expenditure in administrative and economic matters
that go far beyond their ability to comprehend. Judges are specialized in
interpreting laws and are not, as a matter of fact, reliable in implementing
policies that need understanding complex concepts of economics, public
finance, sociology etc and hence they are unable to determine what is
appropriate in each of these domains. Courts are not competent to determine
the nature or scope of positive obligations. ,,;,,. ( f fJ(
" .118 ~2 t ~v
This argument is based on a perceived rigid distinction between classical civil
and political rights and socio-economic rights as negative and positive rights
respectively. But this exclusive classification has been proved to be obsolete, as
all kinds of obligations exist in both categories of rights. Traditionally, civil and
political rights are seen as not requiring proactive measures by the state.
However, if the states limit themselves to exercising their obligations to refrain
from acting, most civil and political rights would not be recognized for a
considerable part of the population. That is why we can see court enforced
positive obligations arising from civil and political claims of, for instance, life,
liberty, security and fair trial. 22 The right to life cannot properly be understood
in a restrictive manner and the protection of this right requires that states
adopt positives measures designed to safeguard life. Also the enforcement of
the right to vote and fair trial both require spending huge money. Moreover,
protection against discrimination can be properly enforced without requiring
positive action on the part of the state. It is in fact, an example difficult to
classify as negative or positive obligation. It requires a third category.
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In addition to this, the positive negative distinction falls foul of the modern
methodology of considering state obligations. It is proved that both kinds of
rights embody the three levels of obligations: the duty to respect, protect and
fulfill. This indicates that the "positive rights objection" would not exclude all
socio-economic obligations. Moreover, not all the rights categorized as socio-
economic fit the mould of state intervention, for instance, the freedom to Iorm
trade unions. All in all, given the fact that all rights are indivisible and
interdependent, and that there is certain overlap between the two categories of
rights, as SOl11erights cannot be clearly classified as belonging to either of
categories, but to both of them, it may not in all respects be so helpful to rely
on the categories of rights altogether.
ii. The Vagueness of Socio-Economic Rights Provisions
According to this argument socio-economic rights are too vague for the
purpose of judicial interpretation and application. The rights are too vague or
complex as they involve many different economic and social policies. It is often
claimed that they represent too vague provisions to be enforceable. They are
said to have a variable content depending on the level of economic
development of the state concerned. Since courts are asked to identify the
kinds of measures that must be taken to fulfill a right, when there is little
guidance offered from the text of the rights to help courts do this task, there
will be a problem in effectively applying them." This reason is very much tied
to the claim that social rights have positive implications unsuited for court
determination. This is,however, proved not to be well founded.
M.Craven has given a prime defence jresponse to this objection. According to
him the remedy to vagueness or generality of a legal norm is judicial
elaboration. In his words:
It is clear that in theory, the generality of a legal norm does not impede
judicial decision making per se .... The justiciability of a particular issue
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depends, not up on the generality of the norm concerned, but rather
upon the authority of the body making the decision. Thus it is apparent
that in a number of cases, national courts have undertaken to apply
constitutional provisions of an exceedingly broad and general nature:"
Moreover, the vagueness of the terms is itself important as it enables courts to
take account of changing circumstances in interpreting rights which are
themselves undergoing constant change within each state." The committee has
confirmed that the vagueness is an important instrument of flexibility. In
addition, "the specific shape and contour of a right is the result of years of
repeated applications of practical reasoning to the facts at hand"."
This perception has been overcome through different developments related,
notably, to the nature, content and scope of socio-economic rights as well as to
related state obligations. The works of the Committee in the form of General
Comments gives a fine elaboration of the nature of each of the rights to make it
easily enforceable. The general comments contain a number of standards that
are announced to be capable of immediate application or ones that may be
elaborated easily at the national levels. In addition to this the works of UN
special reporters, experts, academics and NGO's as well as national and
international and regional case law have all significantly contributed to refute
the assertion and add clarity to state obligations ensuing form socio-economic
rights provisions. In addition, there are recent trends in providing national
elaboration of these rights. South Africa provides a good example as it has
adopted legislation describing in considerable detail what constitutes" adequate
access to water" and adequate housing." These standards assist courts to
provide appropriate and incontestable rulings on these rights.
Another reason that disapproves the vagueness assertion is that courts and UN
human rights bodies are constantly engaged in deciding upon very vague
concepts." Those bodies adjudicating on civil and political rights are used to
considering rights claims in the context of complex pohcies and problems such
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as crime or systematic discrimination. Courts can play just as important a role
in helping states make themselves accountable to socio-economic rights.
Moreover, the idea that socio-economic rights are "too vagu~ Ifor the purpose of
judicial interpretation runs foul of the fact that all human rights are expressed
in bald terms, In addition, to solve the problem of vagueness...>it is better to
approach it from the angle of the levels of state obligations which provide an
easy means to identify a violation. It must also be noted that the ICESCR
especially does not merely list these rights, it describes and defines them in
considerable detail and frequently sets out the steps that should be taken to
achieve their realization. It should be said at last that if all legal provisions were-'
clear and plain, the role of courts would have been greatly diminished. In fact,
giving meaning to a vague provision is what makes them worth establishing
and reliable.
ii. Absence of Enforceable Core Content
This objection flows from the progressive nature of socio-economic rights.
According to this argument since the rights are to be implemented over time,
there is no minimum threshold requirement that judicial authorities can
identify and enforce." These rights are thought to have no immediate aspects.
The main point of this agreement is that minimum core content is a necessity
before courts can enforce such rights. This argument is very much attached to
the vagueness objection.
There are two responses to this objection:
1. That these rights have minimum core contents, and
2. Thea minimum threshold is not a requirement to make a right justiciable.
The fact that the language of rights implies the existence of a core element has
led the Committee to declare that a core content is a necessary part of each
right in the covenant." The Committee equates core obligations with minimum
essential levels of each of the rights. Jeff King argues that it is difficult to argue
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that there are no minimum core obligations arising from socio-economic rights
when the ITIOstauthoritative body charged with its interpretation has expressly
declared SO.31
The second argument against absence of core-content claims is that progressive
obligations are themselves justiciable. States are duty bound to take concrete
and expeditions steps. Many argue that the relative open-ended ness of the
concept of progressive realization particularly in light of the qualification
related to the availability of resources renders the obligation devoid of
meaningful content.
But there can be no justification for elevating a 'claim' to a status of a right if
its normative content could be so indeterminate as to allow for the possibility
that the right holders possess no particular entitlements to any thing. The
involvement of courts in the application of these rights necessarily rebuts this
objection. The fact that courts can review government conduct with out even
considering the question of a definite core entitlement provided by a right was
displayed by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the Grootboom case.
The court ruled that whether or not a state has failed to meet its positive
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights can be tested against the
reasonableness requirement, whether or not the legislative and other measures
taken by the state are reasonable. This proves that courts can rule on cases
even in the absence of core contents.
2.4. 2. Institutional illegitimacy
The objections under this part are based on the presumed problems involved in
courts enforcing socio-economic rights. pursuant to this argument, it is in
principle possible for courts to enforce socio-economic rights, but they suggest
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that it is not appropriate for them to do that Unlike the former, the basis of
objection is, not incapacity but, illegitimacy.
i. Justiciability Amounts to a Massive Expansion of Judicial Review
This argument of illegitimacy is based on the perceived predominantly political
charter of obligations of states implied by socio-economic rights. Adjudicating
on these rights is not an appropriate role for courts since it involves making
policy decisions that are properly the functions of the democratically elected
parliament, There is a belief that courts can not legally substitute their
judgments in social and economic matters for that of legislative bodies. These
types of matter must be dealt with by the legislative and not by courts. The
principle is that judges should not usurp what is essentially the role of the
elected representatives. They argue that legislatures require substantial
freedom in designing the substantive content, procedural mechanism and
enforcement remedies in legislation of socio-economic issues. The legislature,
and not unelected judges, is the appropriate branch of government to make
these decisions. The fear is that courts will usurp the policy prerogatives of
legislatures and begin ordering governments to spend specific amounts on
health or education or implement specific types of policies. This is, however,
argued to be against the praised principle of separation of powers,
A Canadian constitutional scholar provides a good summary of the concern of
some who (tppose social rights. He says that:
Social rights involve a massive expansion of judicial review since it
would bring under judicial scrutiny all of the elements of modern
welfare state, including the regulation of trades and' profession, the
adequacy of labor standards and bankruptcy laws and of course, the
level of public expenditures on social programs 32.
Despite these justified concerns, however, it must be noted that adjudicating
socio-economic rights claims does not require courts to take over policy making
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prerogatives of the government. Rather just as in civil and political rights cases,
courts and other bodies review government decision making to ensure
consistency with fundamental human rights. Holding governments accountable
to human rights does not undermine democracy if rather enhances it.
Moreover, this concern is a gross over Simplification, which in no way reflects
actual practice. It ignores the way in which the enforcement of civil and
political rights has constrained policy making and resources allocation, as well
as created positive obligations to realize these rights. A policy can be overruled
if it poses an unjust encroachment to one or more civil and political rights.
Courts can do the same in the case of socio-economic rights. After all, many
cases on socio-economic rights in fact involve courts dealing with denial of
access to social rights in similar fashion to many civil and political rights, for
instance, unreasonable disconnection of water and sanitation services, unfair
dismissals or discrimination in access to education and health care." That is,
this objection does not offect the claim that socio-economic rights can at least
be protected in the negative from state interference through the active
participation of courts. The focus of judicial inquiry, it must be recognized, is
on the justification for the action and the procedures used.
For cases that involve positive obligations, the judicial inquire is not
significantly different, but often requires a substantial deference to the
legislative and executive branches of the government. There is a growing trend
by adjudicatory bodies to use a "reasonabless" test (explicitly or implicitly) to
evaluate the government's efforts to progressively realize socio-economic rights
in a particular case. The South African experience offers a good example. With
respect to housing the Constitutional Court explained its role in enforcing the
positive aspects of the right to adequate housing as follows:
The measures by the government must establish a coherent public
housing programme directed to wards the progressive realization of
the right to access to adequate housing within the state's available
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means. The programme must be capable of facilitating the realization
of the right. The precise contour and content of the measures to be
adopted are primarily a matter for the legislature and the executive.
They must however, ensure that the measures they adopt are
reasonable,"
The clear impetus of this case is that the involvement of the judiciary in the
enforcement of socio-economic rights will only facilitate the adoption of a more
rights-friendly policies and procedures by the rightful decision makers, the
legislature and the executive. This should never be understood as the judiciary
improperly invading the legitimate functions of the other two government
organs.
Moreover, the system of separation of powers exists to ensure better
governance, but when the merits of this can be achieved through a different
means, invasion of it should be justified. In fact "to save the bird limbs may be
cut". Judicial inquiry should be considered as one means of checks and
balances. In addition when states accepted the elevated status of socio-
economic entitlements as human rights they have necessarily recognized the
application of the rights in courts since justiciability is one of the natural
elements of a right.
In addition to the above coherent defenses to the objection that socio-economic
rights imply an improper institutional change, it is unacceptable for the
following conventional reasons.
Some states confirm the legitimate power of the court through proper
authorization of their role. That is, if the parliament or the constitution takes
the clear step of enacting socio-economic rights legislations expressly allowing
judicial review, then there will be no doubt on the court's role in this area. The
perceived transgression of the separation of power doctrine will be justified by
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such clear provisions. This, in fact, dismantles any arguments against the
justiciablity claim.
The fact that socio-economic right have great fiscal implications is not always
true. There can be identified socio-economic rights that courts can enforce with
out great expense. The right to form trade unions, protection against arbitrary
eviction, non-discrimination in access to employment, housing, social security
benefits etc and the reversal of decisions amounting to retrogressive measures
provide few examples. In fact, the application of the obligations to respect and
protect and discrimination and retrogressive measures have no or very little
resource implications,
The case-by-case approach is also another alternative. According to this option
courts will decide on whether a particular socio-economic right is justiciable or
not depending on the circumstances." The merit of such an approach is that it
gives courts the discretion to consider cases of some of these rights while
reserving the power to reject those that would involve too strong an
institutional change.
A fourth option is based on the variety of redresses that can be granted by
courts. Judge can declare a violation with out enforcing it. Judges may face
three options when faced with a socio-economic rights claims that they deem
justiciable. They can
1) Deny that a violation took place (the easiest one)
2) Declare that a violation occurred but no orders regarding a remedy,
or
3) Declare a violation and choose the least intrusive remedial option.
Hence by tailoring their remedies to suit their institutional role, judges can
enforce socio-economic rights while at the same time reducing any potential
conflict of interest with the role of the legislative and the executive.
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The last argument is what Jeff King calls the paramountcy argument. This is
based on the true proposition that priority should always be given to the
protection of human rights. The problem of courts expanding judicial review
and deciding upon resource constraints is outweighed by the unanswered
violations of human rights. Primary importance should be accorded to the
enhancement of human rights by remedying violations through the
participation of courts in the process. The respect, protection and fulfillment of
all human rights, however ideal, stands at the heart of good governance and
hence social, economic, legal and cultural development.
ii. Judicial Intervention is not the rnost effective means of
implementing social rights.
Here it is claimed that judicial remedies are not effective in realizing full
implementation of socio-economic rights." The first object of judicial scrutiny,
at the national or international levels, is to provide adequate redress and
compensation to victims of human rights violations. They also ensure the
cessation as well as non-repetition of such violations. Experience shows that
significant gain can be made through litigation. While not all the judgments are
implemented, there are many examples of victims securing compensation or
restitution and governments implementing planned projects and carrying out
law and policy reforms. Litigation on access to medicines in Latin America and
South Africa is a noteworthy example.
Moreover, judgment can also have ripple (spreading) effects since a legal
precedent concerning one right has implications for others. Legal cases can
provide a useful vehicle for building advocacy and political campaigns since
they display systematic violations. That is why in many instances the filling of a
case created a space for dialogue with powerful actors. It must always be noted
that litigation may be the only strategy available, particularly for the unpopular,
voiceless minorities, the homeless, the sick, the poor and other marginalized
groups. In deed, it is more the conjunction of different actions and factors that
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can trigger a change in a given situation and can prove effective in realizing
socio-economic rights as well as civil and political rights. In this respect, the
crucial role of courts should never be undermined.
iii. Making socio -economic rights justiciable implies facing an
impossible challenge
According to this argument socio -economic rights require governments to give
everyone houses to comply with the right to housing or 'buy everyone
expensive medicines' to comply with the right to health etc. If you fail to
provide these rights, you agree to provide monetary compensation. That is what
it means for rights to be justiciable. A claim that these rights are justiciable is a
false promise because it can not be fulfilled." Making these rights justiciable
will bankrupt governments.
The above argument is, however, only a myth. The reality is that, governments
have accepted obligations to progressively realize these rights within their
maximum available resources. This requires that states only demonstrate in
good faith the fulfillment of the rights over time within their capacity. Courts
adjudicating socio-economic rights claims have shown considerable deference
to government decisions about resource allocation, and intervened only to
ensure that governments take reasonable steps, without discrimination, and
subject to available resources to respect, protect and fulfill the rights. They
only tempt to show the government its inactions and failuresIt is important to
recall that the state is obliged to provide services to the maximum of available
resources. It is unwillingness, and not incapacity that is considered a violation
and to which a remedy is needed. All in all, this objection greatly undermines
the presumed competence of courts to give meaning to laws.
In conclusion, the role of courts to appraise whether governments have lived up
to their commitments to progressively realize social rights must be
emphasized. The domestic implementation of socio -economic rights cannot be
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assured without the judiciary. We have to recognize the fact that the judiciary
is the ultimate guarantor of all human rights. Adjudicating individual claims
allows the subjective voice of claimants to break through legal principles and
breath life and meaning to human rights." In deed, litigation can spur
legislative changes, attend to individuals or group complaints and provide a
constant and watchful accountability mechanisms over legislative and
administrative spheres. Litigation can also play a useful educative and
trans formative role in the dissemination and understanding of human rights
principles.
It is no longer right to hesitate to challenge and avoid misconceptions
surrounding the idea of justicability of socio-economic rights. That is why the
Maastricht Guidelines declared:
Any person or group who is a victim of a violation of an Ese right
should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at
both national and international levels 39.
The Committee has also responded very well to the non-justicability claim, It
has rejected the commonly held belief that socio-economic rights are
unsuitable for judicial scrutiny and enforcement. It has declared that there is
nothing inherent in the nature of these rights, which puts them, by definition
beyond courts. In view of the Committee:
In relation to civil and political rights, it is generally taken for granted
that judicial remedies for violations are essential. Regrettably, the
contrary assumption is too often made in relation to ESe rights. This
description is not warranted by the nature of rights or by the relevant
covenant provisions.: The adoption of a rigid classification of Ese
rights, which puts them, by definition beyond the reach of the courts,
would thus be arbitrary and incompatible with the principle that the
two sets of human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It would
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also drastically curtail the capacity of courts to protect the rights of the
most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society 40.
The Committee has also noted that the need to ensure justiciabilty is relevant
when determining the best way to give domestic legal effect to the covenant
rights. This asserts that states are to provide legal remedies through the
adoption of legislative measures for violations of socio-economic rights. This,
beyond doubt, proves the justiciaibility of these rights.
2.5 Justiciability at the international level.
Although the justiciability issue has appeared very controversial, regional
courts have made a significant progress in enforcing socio-economic rights.
They have taken a clear step in clear terms. The African Charter, the European
Social Charter and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
all contain provisions guaranteeing socio-economic rights. Also protocols to
some of the conventions have widened the scope of protection of these rights.
This part will display how courts and lor commissions established by such
conventions have pursued the justiciability of socio-economic rights.
2.5.1. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights and
ESCRights
The African states have gone forward in the promotion, respect and protection
of human rights as well as addressing the widespread and systematic violations
of human rights by adopting the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights. The establishment of the African Commission on Human Rights and
recently the African Court on Human rights gives the African human rights
system an extra force to fight the protracted human rights problems in the
continent. In fact no continent in the world needs protection against human
rights violations move than Africa.
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The African Charter embodies provisions both on basic civil and political rights
as well as on ESC rights. The African Charter entrenches the principle of
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights." The charter proceeds
fr0111a novel perspectives that articulates a unified view of human rights as
well as slant this expression in a direction that claims to reflect African cultural
values. The right to work, the right to the best attainable physical and mental
health as well as the right to education are among the socio-economic rights
guaranteed by the charter." However, it is to observe that the charter does not
include some socio-economic rights, for instance, the right to housing and the
right to food. The charter does not guarantee the right to a standard of life. But
there are trends to claim some of the rights derivatively. The commission has
declared that food deprivation constitutes a violation of the charter because it
contravenes the right to respect of the dignity inherent in a human being."
The African Charter established the Commission with a view to promoting and
protecting the rights guaranteed under the charter. As a treaty-monitoring
body, the commission is charged with broad promotional, protective and
interpretative responsibilities, including the examination of states parties
reports, and consideration of interstate, individual and NGO communications 44.
Notwithstanding the African Charter's express recognition of the indivisibility
and interdependence of all human rights, socio-economic rights have been
largely ignored by states parties' to the charter as well as by the African
commission." In fact, the socio-economic rights provisions are the least cited
aspects of the charter. Despite the insignificant number of the communications
on violations of these rights, the commission has rendered some influential
decisions which reflect the stance of the Africa system on the issue. These
decisions clearly suggest that socio-economic rights provisions of the charter
are subject to the interpretative scrutiny of the African Commission.
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A leading case in this respect is the SERAC case decided by the Commision'".
This decision is a landmark as far as the jurisprudence on socio-economic
rights is concerned. The primary rights under consideration were the rights to
satisfactory environment (Art 24) and the right to health (Art 16). The
Commission not only challenged the assumption that socio-economic rights
have far-reaching difference with civil and political rights, it also affirmed the
justiciability of socio-economic rights. The commission ruled that:
The uniqueness of the African situation and the special qualities of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights imposes upon the
African Commission an important task. International law and human
rights must be responsive to African circumstances. Clearly, collective
rights, environmental rights and economic and social rights are
essential elements of human rights in Africa. The African Commission
will apply any of the diverse rights contained in the Africa Charter. It
welcomes this opportunity to make clear that there is no right in the
African Charter that cannot be made ettective."
This is how the Commission reacted to the non-justiciability claim, In the case,
the Commission found Nigeria guilty of violating the invoked provisions.
Moreover, the Commission has in a number of cases found the violation of the
social rights to health and others." All these indicate that socio-economic
provisions of the African Charter are subject to the complaint mechanisms
provided under the charter.
It must also be noted that Articles 47 and 56 of the Banjul charter allow
communications alleging violations of any of the provisions of the charter
without distinction of any kind as to whether it is a civil and political or socio -
economic right. Article 47 allows communications by states if such a state
thinks that "another state party to this charter has violated the provisions of
the charter'. In fact this groundless distinction is ousted from the outset by the
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preamble of the charter which confirms the interdependence, indivisibility and
interrelatedness of all rights.
Despite these facts the socio-economic provisions are the least cited aspects of
the charter. Moreover, although the states reporting guidelines issued by the
Africa commtssion requires the inclusion of specific information on socio-
economic rights, states parties' reports to the commission hardly contain any
useful information on the implementation of the socio-economic rights
provisions of the charter.
In conclusion, it is recommendable that socio-economic rights be permanently
presented on the agenda of the commission. The commission needs to perform
a more persuasive task on this area. NGO's should also give emphasis to cases
of violation of these rights. Only then will the acknowledgment of the
indivisibility and the justicibility of socio-economic rights is to achieve its goal
and meaning.
2.5.2. Justiciability in the European Human rights system.
The European Social Charter and its additional protocols are the main
instruments of the Council of Europe in the economic and social field. The
Additional protocol to the European Social Charter sets out the obligation to
submit regular reports and established the procedure of collective complaints
49. The reports will be examined by the European Committee of Social Rights.
The Committee assesses from a legal standpoint the compliance of states
parties laws and practice with the obligations arising from the charter. Then it
draws conclusions which might be positive or negative depending on whether
the state is in conformity or not.
More important is the procedure of collective complaint mechanism through
which complaints may be addressed to the committee by some selected
organizations. 50 Complaints must, however, relate to a collective situation not
an individual. It must also allege a violation of the charter of social rights.
60
Nonetheless, this complaint mechanism clearly suggests that violations of
socio-economic rights under the charter are subject to deliberation by the
European Committee of Social Rights. The Committee may declare whether the
charter has been violated.
Moreove:Jthe European Committee of Social Rights has derived a genuine and
justiciable right to medical and social assistance from article 13(1) of the social
charter. Under this provision states commit themselves to ensuring the
enjoyment of a certain rights The committee developed a case law on this
provision by way of examining government reports and expressing its
comments on them." The Committee has emphasized the obligation of states
to provide recourse to a court or another independent body in administrative
decisions on medical and social assistance, as well as the obligation to secure
social and medical assistance to necessitous persons as of right not as they
think fit. It declared that this is an obligation which they may be called on in
court to honor. The existing case law on article 13(1) of the European Social
Charter indicated that these rights are understood as an individual and
justiciable right." This has gained support through the collective complaint
procedure mechanism.
Finally, the experience of the European Court of Human Rights indicate a
different mechanism of protecting socio-economic Rights. The court has
extended the protection of the European Convention on Human rights to some
aspects of socio-economic rights." This is one aspect of the integrated
approach. It is the fair trial clause in Article 6(1) that provides the means of
extension. The court interpreted the right to free legal assistance as the social
dimension of the right to fair trial." The court extends the right to access to
courts aspect of this entitlement to social security disputes.
The court did this in a number of cases." In the Schuler-Zgraggen case, the
court further extended the procedurerprotection under Article 6(1). The court
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ruled that ''. To day the general rule is that Article 6(1) does apply in the field of
social insurance, including even welfare assistance". This is an encouraging
development in the sphere of protection of socio -economic rights.
2.5.3. The Inter -American system in the area of socio economic
rights
Socio-economic rights are recognized in the Inter-American system in different
instruments adopted by the American states. First, the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man recognizes a number of civil and political as well
as socio-economic rights." A rather more extensive range of socio-economic
rights is included in the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights (Protocol of San Salvador)." It represents a clear advance in
setting forth ESC rights as compared to the Declaration and the American
Convention. The content of the rights and obligations undertaken by states is
defined with greater specificity. The protocol established the duty to submit
periodic reports on the measures taken by states parties. More importantly the
protocol provides for a system of individual petitions reserved for certain
rights, namely trade union rights (art 8(a) of the protocol, and the rights to
education (art 13).58 The complaints are permitted when these rights "are
violated by action directly attributable to a state party to this protocol..". The
individual complaint mechanism is thus selective and limited only to the above
mentioned provisions.
Under this system, complaints are first addressed to the Inter- American
Commission on Human Rights which decides on whether the petition has to be
submitted/ transferred to the Inter-American Court of Human Right for judicial
detennination. The court will in such a way be called upon to adjudicate these
specific socio-economic rights. The limitation to the petition mechanism is
criticized as representing a backsliding with respect to the possibilities offered
by the American Declaration and the American Convention 59.
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The Commission's power to hear individual complaints against member states
of the Organization of American States (OAS) alleging the violation of a right
protected by the American Declaration was recognized in 1966. Once the
Commission establishes that the state has violated the rights recognized in the
treaty in question, it issues recommendations to the state to remedy the
violation. The states obligation to make most serious efforts to carry out the
recommendations made by the commissions is doubtless.
There are some cases where the commission has recognized the violation of
socio-economic rights. But it must be' noted that in most of the cases the
commission starts by taking note of violations of civil and political rights. In a
case against Cuba the commission considered that the victim was tortured
repeatedly while jailed and held Cuba liable for violating the right to
preservation of health and well-being, (Art 11 of the Declarationl." Also
Argentina was held responsible for violating the right to education (Article 12)
where a presidential decree ordered that all activities of Jehovah's witnesses
cease." This decision was made in the context of the right to assembly. More
over, in a case against Brazil the Commission held the government of Brazil
responsible for violation of the right to the preservation of health and well-
being." This case is very important is so far as the analysis of the violation of
ESCrights separately is concerned.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has issued opinions on the
justiciability of socio-economic rights in the context of its general
pronouncements and under its advisory jurisdiction. The court confirmed the
concept of indivisibility of the human rights system, with regard to justiciability
the court said:
The so-called civil and political rights, in general are easier to
individualize and make inquiry in accordance with a legal procedure
capable of resulting in a jurisdictional protection. The court considers
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that, among the so-called economic, social and cultural rights, there are
also some that act or can act as subjective right jurisdictionally
inquirable. 63
The Court added that some ESC rights cannot be subjected to protection by a
judicial or quasi judicial system identical to the present system to protect civil
and political rights. This opinion was given during the drafting of the protocol
of San Salvador and its impact is reflected in the limited individual complaint
mechanism to very few rights under the protocol.
This clearly implies that the court has not given full recognition to the
justiciability of socio-economic rights. It rather adopted a discriminarorv way of
dealing with the issue. The general lines offered by the court are contrary to the
doctrine that is being established by the UN Committee on ESCrights."
All in all, internationally, the justiciability of social-economic rights has
developed mainly by means of the complaint procedures to commission and/or
courts established by instruments protecting ESC rights. There is also a
developing trend in pursuing an approach of protecting socio-economic rights
through civil and political rights. These mechanisms have improved the
promotion and protection of these rights though the world has still to go far to
achieve its tremendous goal of fully realizing these rights. The availability of
remedies at the international level also provides a useful incentive to ensure the
development of effective remedies at the national level, however. This is
certain.
In conclusion, it is an important aspect of the effective protection of socio-
economic rights that these rights are understood as legally binding individual
and collective rights. Recognizing the status of socio-economic rights as
justiciable entitlements is crucial to honoring the political, moral and legal
commitments undertaken by states when the international bill of rights was
adopted. The acknowledgment of their justiciability gives new impetus to a
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general understanding of their legally binding nature and hence to the new
realization of positive state obligations flowing from them." Courts are playing
an increasingly vital role in enforcing socio-economic rights, making clear the
transition from need and charity to meaningful entitlement and binding
obligations of states to ensure protection of ESC rights administratively,
judicially or legislatively. But the combination of these organs is a must,
Nonetheless, in the face of non-performance it is the justice system that should
set it motion the machinery to guarantee the rights. Under the domestic law, it
is the judiciary, which is the ultimate guarantor of person's rights. The main
objections to justiciable social rights are polincal." Justiciability is the natural
implication of a right. Courts are, beyond doubt, both capable and legitimate
institutions for enforcing them. Only the involvement of courts gives the
human rights system lungs to breathe violations out and ensure their ultimate
full realization.
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Chapter III
3.Comparative Analysis / Selected National
Experiences/
Most states include within their constitutional or legislative system clauses,
provisions or sections embodying human rights standards. National legislation
or constitutional enactment guaranteeing human rights characteristically reflect
priorities or values treasured within that particular system and mayor may not
reflect the content of international human rights guarantees. In some countries,
a wide range of rights may be constitutionally protected including civil and
political as well as ESe rights. In others.only a limited range of civil rights are
recognized.
The status of human rights enactments with in different systems also varies
considerably not only in terms of extent of protection but also in terms of their
hierarchical position with in the constitutional structure and in terms of the
remedies made available. In some countries, a human rights clause in
legislation may be directly invoked by an individual beneficiary as a cause of
action before courts leading to possible measures of enforcement or the
provision of remedies. In other countries, however, the human rights clauses
may take the form of "directive guidelines" whose purpose is to guide
governmental policy makers rather than give rise to enforceable individual
rights. Such directive principles will not normally be invocable before courts
though exceptionally this might happen but only in their inspirational and
interpretative role. Their invocability is provided expressly in some countries
while others exclude their enforceability through silence depending on the
principle that policies are beyond court interpretation.
Nowadays, the vast majority of countries have domestically recognized socio-
economic rights, either through the application of international treaties in
domestic law or through constitutional or human rights provisions which refer
to socio- economic rights to be accorded with the same mechanisms for review
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or enforcement as civil and political rights or both. Despite this, it is
uncommon to see socio-economic rights to be accorded with the same
mechanisms for review of enforcement as civil and political rights. There is a
common view that these rights are non- justiciable' or 'policy oriented' and
hence unsuited to judicial enforcement in any form. This claim/ objection is
based on the perceived exaggerated characteristic differences between civil and
political and socio- economic rights. This idea, however, ignore! the well-
founded view that what is common to both categories highly exceeds the more
technical differences between the two. Both of them stand at the heart of
human dignity. This is what is implied by the principle of indivisibility of the
indissoluble human rights system. That is why in recent years there has been a
trend to accept the possibility of judicial enforcement of such rights, but to
confine it to areas that do not entirely usurp government decision making.
This chapter is intended to cast light on the recent national developments in
the jurisprudence on the justiciability of socio-economic rights in some
countries.
3.1. The Indian Experience
The Indian Constitution guarantees "fundamental rights" to all citizens. These
include the right to life (article 21) and the right to equality. The constitution
makes the civil and political rights expressly enforceable through courts. A
person can seek enforcement of fundamental rights and seek redress for their
breach. Socio-economic rights are set out in a section of the constitution
entitled "Directive Principles-of State policy" (DPSP here after). Many of the
provisions in this part correspond to the provisions of the ICESCR.The match
between the constitution and the prevailing view on Socio- economic rights
should be observed. This should not be taken as a happenstance.
These Socio- economic rights are expressly declared to be un enforceable in
court .The constitution provides that the DPSP:
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Shall not be enforceable by any court but the principles there in laid
down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country
and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles in making
law.'
It is important to note the overlap in the apparent distinction between the two
set of rights has also gained expression in the Indian context between
fundamental rights and the DPSP. The bar to justiciability of the DPSP, and
hence socio-economic rights, is spelled out in some sense in the constitution
itself.
Despite this clear constitutional hurdle, the Indian Supreme Court has tried to
give protection for aspects of socio-economic rights through its constitutional
right and duty of protecting the "fundamental rights" provisions of the
constitution 2. The Indian judiciary has overcome this apparent limitation by a
wisdom full and creative exercise of its interpretative power. The Supreme
Court is probably the first organ to finely apply the integrated approach in the
most comprehensive way.
The Supreme Court settled the heightened tussle for primacy between
fundamental rights and the DPSP declaring the two to be complementary and
preconditions for each other. It is now accepted that what is fundamental in the
governance of the country cannot be less significant than what is significant in
the life of the individual 3. In the same case, it was declared that "in building up
a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights
should be subordinatel to the directive principles". This view that the
fundamental rights and DPSP are complementary, "neither part being superior
to the other", has held the field since." Hence, the distinction drawn by the
constitution has not barred the court from declaring the equal status and
importance of the two set of rights.
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The DPSP have, through important constitutional amendment became the
benchmark to insulate legislation enacted to achieve social objectives, as
enumerated in some of the DPSP, from attacks of invalidation by courts.' But
here the court has the power of judicial review to examine if in fact, the
legislation is intended to achieve the objective it is adopted for. More over,
courts have used DPSP to uphold the constitutional validity of statutes that
apparently impose restrictions on the fundamental rights as long as they are
stated to achieve the objective of the DPSP.6 To conclude, the DPSPare seen as
aids to interpret the constitution, and more specifically to provide the basis,
scope and extent of the content of a fundamental right.
Following are explanations of decisions of the Indian Supreme Court on matters
of socio- economic rights. Despite the express constitutional preclusion of the
directive principles from judicial enforcement, the Supreme Court has given
indirect effect to the directive principles by interpreting civil and political
rights, such as and mainly, the right to life. The right to an adequate quality of
life is ruled to include the right to adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter. The
Court has repeatedly interpreted the right to life in the most robust way. To
mention one, in the Francis Coralie Mullin case the court decided that:
The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all
that goes with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate
nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and
expressing one self in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing
and commingling with fellow human beings. The magnitude and
components of this right would depend upon the extent of economic
development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter,
include the bare necessities of life and also the right to carry on such
functions and activities as to constitute the bare minimum expression of
the human sett.'
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Hence the government cannot deprive its citizens of these essential elements of
their right to life unless done under reasonable, fair and just procedure.
This expanded interpretation of the right to life combined with the use of
public interest litigation, where by the rules of standing and procedure ~
very relaxed and hence creating access to the majority of the population who
were unable to access the justice system on account of their social, economic
and other disabilities, led the court into areas where there was a crying need for
social justice." By reading, in to the ambit of the right to life, the rights of
dignity, living conditions, health etc, the court overcome the difficulty of
justiciability of socio-economic rights which were considered policy guidelines
and hence unenforceable.
In one. casEj with respect to the right to work, the court relied on the
prohibition of discrimination to order the government to stop classifying
workers as permanent and causal for purpose of paying less to the latter. Every
worker is entitled to the minimum pay payable to employees in regular cadres.
The court ruled:
We are of the view that on the facts and in circumstances of this cas~
the classification of employees in to regularly recruited employees and
causal employees for the purpose of paying less than the minimum pay
payable to employees in the corresponding regular cadres particularly
in the lowest rungs of the department where pay scales are the lowest is
not tenable. 9
The court employed the phrase "hostile discrimination" and suggested the non-
discrinlination clause as providing a room for protection of socio- economic
rights.
The right to shelter, which forms part of the right to an adequate standard of
living under article 11 of the ICESCR,has found no corresponding expression in
the DPSP. But the court has read this right in the right to life. The court has
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gone as far as to say, "The right to life ... would take with in its sweep the right
to food ... and a reasonable accommodation to live in" .10
In another case, Banwasi Seva Ashram V. State of V.F..1 the attempt of the
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. /NTPC/ to oust "tribals" from their
traditional forest lands, which provided them with food and shelter was
challenged by the court which ordered the NTPC to find alternative dwellings
for the tribals and have them approved by the court before continuing.ll
In a more recent case, the court confirmed the duty of the government to
provide incapable citizens with the resource to build their own houses. The
court based its decision on the right to life. The issue involved the eviction of
encroachers in a busy locality of Ahemedabad city. The court held that:
Though no person has a right to encroach and erect structures or
otherwise on footpaths, pavements or public streets or any other place
reserved or earmarked for a public purpose, the state has the
constitutional duty to provide adequate facilities and opportunities by
distributing its wealth and resources for settlement of life and erection
of shelter over their heads to make the right to life meaningful. 12
The Supreme Court has also entertained cases concerning the right to health.
The duty of the state to improve public health is enshrined under the
constitution in the part dealing with DPSP.13Nevertheless, the right to health
has been the least difficult area for the court in terms of justiciability. The
court has always read the right to health in the right to lite." In another case,
where government hospitals in Calcutta refused to admit a person in need of
emergency treatment as they did not have vacant beds, the Supreme Court
declared the right to health to be a fundamental right and enforced the right of
the victim by asking the government of West Bengal to pay him compensation
for the loss he suffered. It directed the government to devise a mechanism to
establish a primary health care with particular reference to treatment of
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patients during an emergency. IS The Court mandated compulsory health
insurance for every worker in an asbestos industry as enforcement of the
worker's fundamental right to health." Moreover, the court has had occasions
to examine the quality of drugs and medicines being marketed in the country
and even ask that some of them be banned."
The Court has, however, cautioned that the duty of the government to ensure
the fundamental right to health was subject to the economic capacity of the
state. The court emphasized:
/I No state or country can have unlimited resources to spend on any of its
projects. That is why it only approves its projects to the extent it is
feasible. The same holds good for providing medical facilities to its
citizens including its employees. Provisions of facilities cannot be
unlimited. It has to be to the extent finances permit Y
In this case, the court found the principle of fixation of rate and scale under the
government's policy justified.
Another area which deserves talking about is the right to education found
under Article 47 of the DPSP. But the right to education as a fundamental and
enforceable right as such was confirmed by the Supreme CourlqHere again, the
court used the right to life to recognize the right to education. The court
declared that private educational institutions that are accredited by the state
could not charge exorbitant tuition fees for educational courses. Once more, the
court applied an expansive definition of the right to life and brought private
institutions within the ambit of the bill of rights.
In another case.,where private medical and engineering colleges challenged the
state legislation regulating the charging of "Capitation" fees from students
seeking admission as enforcement of their right to business, the court
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expressly denied the claim. In addition, the court explained the right to
education as meaning:
That a citizen has a right to call upon the state to provide educational
facilities to him with in the limits of its economic capacity and
development ... we have held the right to education to be implicit in the
right of life because of its inherent fundamental importance ... 20
In conclusion, it can be clearly observed that under the Indian legal system,
Socio- economic rights are no less important that fundamental rights. Some
times they are even considered justifications to limitations to the latter. The
judiciary is not fettered by any apparent injunction in the constitution against
judicial enforceability of the DPSP.
The Supreme Court has never hesitated to project them as enforceable
supplying the content of the fundamental rights themselves. The court has
pointed oUJ in unequivocal terms, the state's obligations towards individuals by
referring to the directive principles.
The introduction of the concept of public interest litigation combined with the
court's robust interpretation of the fundamental rights has resulted in the ESC
rights, symbolized by the DPSP, being constantly claimed and enforced by the
court. The Indian experience clearly demonstrates that the agenda and policies
of the state can be shaped to a considerable extent by a creative and activist
judiciary." These achievements illustrate the merits of allowing judicial review
in socio- economic cases.
The court has apparently not opened massive floodgates of litigation,
nor has it ordered enormous remedies that are unaftordable for the
state. Rather, it has given protection where it could by means of
progressive, liberal and soundly reasoned interpretations of the right to
life ,,22
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This is how Jeff King praised the leading role the court has played and its worth
to follow.
3.2. The South -African Experience.
Another country with a relatively developed jurisprudence on socio-economic
rights is South Africa. South Africa's final constitution lists a broad range of
socio-economic rights such as access to adequate housing, health care services,
including reproductive health care, sufficient food and water and social security
including appropriate social assistance. Some components of these rights are
subject to limitations related to availability of resources in the same way as the
ICESCR.What makes the constitution modern and unique is that is provides for
a wide range of civil and political as well as socio-economic rights and that all
these rights are subject to judicial review. The classification in the Indian
constitution, adopted long ago, has no place in the South African constitution.
In some cases, it might even be possible to follow socio-economic rights claims
against private entities. The decisions of the Constitutional Court confirmed
that in appropriate circumstances the courts can and should enforce the socio-
economic rights.
The challenge against Socio- economic rights as being non-justiciable was
rejected by the Constitutional Court when it was brought before it by some
petitioners. The court declared that:
We are of the view that these rights are, at least to some extent,
justiciable. As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of the
civil and political rights entrenched in the new constitution will give rise
to similar budgetary implications without compromising their
justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably
give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their
justiciability. At the very minimum, socio- economic rights can be
negatively protected from improper invasion. 23.
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The court decided, inter alia, the fact that courts were engaged in enforcing
positive obligation gave them the reason to believe that continuing to do so
with socio-economic rights would not result in the feared drastic institutional
change. It seems that the court was highly influenced and inspired by the
creative interpretation and agile involvement of the Indian Supreme Court in
the sphere of socio-economic rights enforcement in the face of constitutional
hurdle. In recent decisions, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the
constitution obliges the state to act positively with respect to socio-economic
rights.
In the Grootboom case, the court reiterated its recognition of the justifiability
of Socio-economic rights." This decision settled the tussle on the issue. The
court ruled that the government has failed "to make reasonable provision of
temporary shelter within its available resources" for people with" no access to
land, no roof over their heads, and who were living in intolerable conditions or
crisis situations" In this case, the court suggested the reasonableness criteria to
evaluate whether the government's measures are targeted to achieve the dicta
of the constitution in socio-economic spheres.
In another case", the request of the applicant to treatment of an emergency
health problem was refused by the court. The ground of objection by the
hospitals was that the machines were reserved for a class of patients that were
not on the verge of death which the claimant was. The court held that he did
not have the right to treatment based on their definition of 'emergency' and a
narrow interpretation of the protection offered by the right to health." The
court has impliedly recognized the measures by the hospitals as reasonable in
granting medical assistance only in cases of emergency. That is, as a means of
effectively using the resources at hand. Another implication is that the court
does uphold its views on justiciability.
Although both the Grootboom and Soobramoney cases have been criticized for
not providing the substantive relief sought by the petitioners, they demonstrate
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that accepting judicially enforceable socio- economic rights will not lead to the
judicial excess same had expected." The South African Constitutional Court
has got the widest field to directly enforce these rights compared to the Indian
Supreme Court. This little but encouraging experience shows the future is
bright and that courts are cautiously entering the domain of social rights
adjudication.
3.3. The Experience of the United States
In the United States, there is a conventional view that socio- economic rights are
not justiciable. The primary reason suggested is the difficulty in identifying a
violation of such rights." Official policy has been explicitly against the concept
of socio-economic rights. More over, the US did not yet ratify the ICESCR
though it has signed it. In fact, during Reagan's administration the Department
of State on Human Rights policy endorsed the unqualified rejection of these
"rights" as rights. Human rights were to be explicitly defined for the purposes
of future US policy as" meaning political rights and civil libernes':" In fact, the
constitution of the U.S does not contain any express provision guaranteeing
socio-economic entitlements.
One exception to the rule of non-justiciability of these set of rights has been
with regard to the right to education where courts (especially at state level)
have been actively engaged in the question what state obligations are in
meeting the right to education. This started with the declaration by the
Supreme Court that segregated schools were inherently unequal which
promised a remedy that has never been fully realized in any state.'? Segregated
education was ruled to be a violation of the right to equality enshrined in the
cons ti tu tion.
In another cas:, the Supreme Court unanimously approved a sweeping judicial
remedy to the failure of integration (desegregation efforts)." The remedies
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granted were fixing the boundaries of school districts and busing of students
between intercity and outlying schools. This allowed courts to provide for
remedies- even those that would involve the expenditure of huge amounts of
money- for violations of children's right to education. The creation and
enforcement of the busing remedy thus, in some ways, represents a high point
in the protection and justiciability of the right to education and all socio-
economic rights in general though opponents might say that the cases were
brought under a civil and political rights framework, namely equal protection
clause, and not as a socio-economic right enforcement." It must be noted that
the method represents the integrated approach of protecting these rights.
However, in a latter case the Supreme Court made it clear that no federal right
to an adequate education exists." Though the Brown case proclaimed education
to be important, in this case adequate education was ruled not to be a
fundamental right protected by the constitution. This decision suggests that
publicly funded education is provided not as a right but at the mercy of the
government.
What is worth mentioning here is the liberal development in the inclusion of
the right to education in the constitutions of most of the states. The language
of the clauses providing for the right and the affirmative duties imposed by the
state legislative differs however. In most state courts, the claim that education
should be adequate has gained acceptance. Judges have uphold increased state
obligations in about 70 percent of the cases avoiding the conventional wisdom
that, socio- economic rights are unenforceable and non-justiciable in the U.S at
least at the state level. Courts facing legal challenges to states funding system
have ordered such states to reform the way they pay for schools. Most of those
cases were based on adequacy arguments and hence giving tangible content to
the perceivably non-justiciable Socio-economic right to education."
81
The West Virginian Supreme Court has declared the right to education a
fundamental right of every American as opposed to the decision of the US
Supreme Court in the Rodriguez case 35,The New York's highest court rejected
an "eighth grade education is enough" standard and added all public school
students statewide are entitled to a meaningful high school education 36It did so
by emphasizing that the constitution (of New York) requires a "Meaningful high
school education". Moreover, the court affirmed the trial courts conclusion that
students must be provided with skills they need today to function capably as
civil participants. Litigation is under way in a number of states where courts are
putting pressure on legislatures to spend from 15 percent to 40 percent more
on education .37
The above discussions clearly prove the recognition of the right to education as
a justiciable socio- economic right in the United States. This, it is hoped, will
facilitate the ultimate acceptance of the whole system of Socio-economic rights
in the US. It is important to note that the model set forth above assert that the
non- justiciability of socio-economic rights in the US is the rule at present, but
it is a rule waiting to be broken."
3.4. The Experience of Argentina
Argentina is possibly the first country where the courts passed the most
influential and intrusive decision on a matter of socio-economic rights.
Argentina is a monist state where any ratified treaty automatically becomes
part of domestic law Argentina provides a fruitful and sparking example of
using courts for direct enforceability of socio-economic rights.
The prominent example in this respect is the Mariela Viceconte case." which
concerns the right to health. The case was designed by Argentinean groups to
ensure that the state would manufacture a vaccine against Argentina
hemorrhagic fever, which threatens the lives of 3.5 million people who live in
endemic area which includes the Moist Pampas of Argentina. The disease is
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difficult to diagnose quickly and affects a population that does not have easy
access to preventive medical services. A vaccine, candid I, is proven by the
World Health Organization. The production of this vaccine is not profitable for
commercial laboratories. Some 200,000 doses where obtained from the Salk
Institute in the United States for an experimental program. 140,000 doses were
administered from 1991-1995 to residents of the endemic zone. The state was
unable to carry out a massive vaccination campaign due to the lack of an
adequate quantity of the vaccine.
A judicial action was filed to protect the right to health of the persons living in
the affected areas. The Court of First Instance rejected the case. However, in
1998 the Court of Appeals ruled favorably on the same case. The judgment
established the state's obligation to manufacture the vaccine. The court also set
a legally binding deadline for the obligation to be met It also imposed a special
duty on two officials of the government. The appellate court's judgment was
based on the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, the UDHR,
and article 12 of the ICESCR. All these instruments are incorporated in to the
domestic law in Argentina and are considered to from part of the
consntution." The court has thus ordered the state to manufacture this vaccine
by itself. This clearly implies the acceptance of Socio- economic rights as
justiciable and enforceable under the Argentinean system.
Despite the guarantee of the manufacture of this vaccine, the case is very
important for raising other issues relevant to the content and meaning of socio-
economic rights:
- It reaffirms the judicial process as a method for enabling ordinary
citizens to challenge state agencies regarding the merit of environmental
and health policies. It recognizes citizen's standing to request a vaccine
for 3.5 million people in the affected area. It reinforces the role of the
collective writ of amparo (a constitutionally remedy providing for a relief)
as a means of citizen participation in and review of public affairs.
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- Direct application by a domestic court of international standards on the
right to health expands the scope of activism for ensuring the realization
of ESe rights.
- The imposition by the court of personal responsibility on two ministers
for the manufacture of the vaccine with a specific deadline demonstrates
that the obligations arising from ESe rights are legal in nature and entail
legal liabilities.
- The judgment also affirms the role of the state as guarantor of the right
to health when certain services turn out to be unprofitable or otherwise
ill- advised for the private sector. In this way, the judgment seeks to
strike a balance between the state and market, as the only way to ensure
respect for human rights.
- In response to the finding that a constitutionally guaranteed right had
been violated, the judges set a limit on the discretional authority of the
executive by ordering that it carry out what it had committed to under
the constitution.
- Finally, the judgment defines the role of the judiciary when authorities
fail to act. In this case the court did not hesitate to assume its role as the
ultimate guarantor of fundamental rights even though it involved socio-
economic rights 41.
All in all, this case manifests the unfolding truth that courts are tubes through
which the voice of the voiceless and the least fortunate citizens of the state
impact on state agenda and policies. Enforcement of Ese rights through courts
ensures the merits of both direct and indirect democracy to be exploited by the
state. The failures of indirect democracy (ignorance of the excluded) should be
fixed by the involvement of the needy society through the mouth of courts. The
theoretical objections to the dignified role of courts have no place in Argentina.
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3.5. The Canadian Experience
The non-justiciability of socio-economic rights has been the trend in Canadian
jurisprudence. With respect to claims that the government action (or inaction)
has resulted in a violation of a section of the Canadian Charter of Human
Rights, the right to Life, liberty or security of the person, the tendency of courts
has been to conceptualize the claim as being the "enhancement" of benefits,
and therefore purely economic interests Most lower courts have tended to
accept the notion that as a general rule the charter does not encompass
positive socio-economic rights, and that social policy is not an appropriate
domain for judicial application.
In one case, an Ontario Superior Court accepted the uncontroversial evidence
that cuts of social assistance rates would have a significantly adverse impact on
vulnerable groups:
The daily strain of surviving and caring for children on low and
inadequate income is unrelenting and debilitating. All recipients of
social assistance and their dependents will suffer in some way from the
reduction in assistance. Many will be forced to find other
accommodations or make other living arrangements. If cheaper
accommodation is not available many may soon be homeless ... 42
Despite this expression of the dire consequences of the cut and the argument
that the applicants rights to security of the person and equality right under the
Canadian Charter should be interpreted in light of Canada's international
human rights undertakings, the court rejected the claim and relied on the
principle that socio-economic rights are not justiciable. One judge commented
that "Much economic and social policy is simply beyond the institutional
competence of the court'?". It was suggested that the court has no jurisdiction"
to second guess policy/political decisions".
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All in all the, Canadian view is that Socio- economic rights are not included in
the charter and that they are non- justiciable and that courts are not
empowered and capable to review the adequacy of provincial social security
measures. The same view prevails with respect to other aspects of socio-
economic rights, too. In relation to the right to health it was decided that the
charter did not protect against economic deprivation or guarantee "additional
benefits" which might enhance life, liberty and security of the person." The
non- discrimination clause is however being exploited even in cases of
provision of socio-economic right.
All in all, Canadian courts have refused socio- economic rights as part of the
charter and not justiciable as such. The view is that courts cannot substitute
their judgment in social and economic matters for that of legislative bodies.
Courts have constantly held that the charter does not guarantee Socio-economic
utilities as part of the right to life or security of the person and that these types
of matters must be dealt with by the legislature and not by the courts. Courts
are not, it is said, competent to determine the nature or scope of positive
obligations. The principle is that, legislatures require substantive freedom in
designing the substantive content, procedural mechanisms and enforcement
remedies in legislation of this kind. The legislative and not the courts are the
appropriate branch of government to make these decisions. Where
governments dispense with Social programs or benefits to remedy
disadvantage, the trend is for the courts to refuse to intervene on behalf of
beneficiaries. Courts will grant governments a wide berth when setting
programs to address complex problems in the face of fiscal constraints. Judges
are reluctant to usurp what they see as the role of the elected legislatures.
Courts have been deferential to government decisions. They have adopted an
extreme view of the doctrine of separation of powers. Even when the
government action is against the purpose and vows of it, courts should remain
silent and apart.
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In conclusion, this variety in the trend to the understanding of the justiciability
of socio- economic rights is reflective of the diversity in the domestic approach
to the issue. That it is an area of hot debate and controversy is uncontroversial.
The creative exercise of their narrow interpretative powers by some courts is
encouraging and a model and highly facilitates the move to confirm the legal
status and justiciability of socio- economic rights. The trend of non-
justiciability in some countries is criticized by the ICESCRCommittee as relying
on an out dated and artificial distinction between positive and negative rights."
In fact, the UN has, for instance, identified the failure of Canadian courts to
provide remedies for violations of social and economic rights as a significant
concern.
ow a days, the world has understood the diversity in states' approach to these
issues as reflective of the predominantly political nature of the non-
justiciability objection. Whether or not socio-economic rights are justiciable
depends on the will of the political organ and not on the outdated
categorization of rights. In fact, the judicial remedies give meaning to the lives
of the poor and the helpless to the extent the state can achieve. The more
appropriate approach is to permit judicial consideration of these rights if their
guarantee under the international as well as in many domestic arenas is to be
given life. Refusal of justiciability of these rights denies them the legal
character they are clothed in to day.
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CHAPTER IV
Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights in Ethiopia
The human rights system establishes norms and principles touching on
virtually all facets of life. These norms and principles are established through
international human rights instruments as well as by national constitutions and
legislations. The unity of purpose of all the human rights laws establishing the
mmimum conditions for human dignity, has led to the consistent reafftrmation
by the international community of the indivisibility and interdependence of all
human rights whether civil, cultural, economic, Political or social. Despite this,
the arena of human rights discourse and practice has been dominated by
attention to the classical civil and political rights compared to the rare voices
echoed with respect to socio-economic rights. This contradicts the fact that the
two set of rights are placed at a par with each other, needing equal attention
and protection.
Socio--economic rights are given wide attention and strong support in the
international arena than in domestic legal systems. That is why in most
constitutions of the world such rights does not form part of the fundamental
rights guaranteed. There are, however, recent developments both in the
guarantee and enforcement mechanisms of such rights. Some countries have
tncorporatedenforceable socio-economic rights in their constitutions and other
legislations. A look into some modern constitutions reveals this fact, the
nearest example being the Ethiopian constitution. About one third of the
constitution is devoted to enshrining fundamental rights and freedoms. In fact,
one of the main reasons behind the very existence of the constitution is the
need for the full respect of individuals and peoples fundamental human rightsf-
The Ethiopian constitution enshrines the fundamental rights and freedoms in
two parts: the first dealing with " human rights" and the other with
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"democratic rights'; In the part of " democratic rights" are included what are
called socio- economic rights. We can say the constitution includes a third
unrecognized part dealing with socio- economic rights as a separate article is
used to deal with these rights.
4.1. Socio- economic rights under the constitution (FDRE)
Ethiopia is one of the countries which has exploited the method of protection
of socio-economic rights through constitutional provisions. This is the primary
method for the domestic implementation of such rights as the constitution is
the basic law of the state. The Ethiopian constitution recognizes that the
protection of individual liberties and the meeting of social needs are equally
important values. This is evidenced by the fact that the constitution integrates
civil and political as well as socio-economic rights. The approach taken by the
constitution with respect to civil and political rights, which are imitations of the
UDHR, is different from that with respect to socio-economic rights. The latter
provisions are far from a verbatim of the said standard of achievement.
Ioreover, socio-economic rights are defined as to benefit a relatively narrower
group of individuals than the civil and political rights. They are guaranteed for
the benefit of "every Ethiopian" and sometimes very narrow groups. Article 41
(5) of the constitution provides an example. Here, the beneficiaries are the
physically and mentally disabled, the aged and children who are left without
parents or guardian. It should be noted that none of the rights under article 40.r.+
and 41 are formulated for the benefit "everyone". This clearly excludes non-
citizens from claiming the socio- economic rights in the Ethiopian bill of rights.
The difference in formulation of article 42 should also be noted. It is meant to
protect factory and service workers; government employees etc without
referring to Ethiopians as such. This opens a possibility where non- citizens can
be beneficiaries of the right to work.
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A very important point to emphasize is the relatively loose obligation imposed
by the ICESCRon developing countries in fulfilling ESC rights of non- citizens."
Such states are given the power to determine the extent to which they would
guarantee the socio- economic rights of non-citizens. The Ethiopian
constitution seems to have gone far in excluding, almost completely, the
benefits of article 41 Irorn non-nationals.
It is now the right time to deal with the rights included in our constitution
under the broad term socio-economic rights. Following is on analysis of the
contents of the provisions of article 41 of the constitution as this is the main
provision on these rights.
Article 41(1) ensures the right to free engagement in economic activities and
the right to pursue a livelihood of ones choice any where within the national
territory. This provision can be explained to be one of restraint in that the
government should not meddle with the choice of individuals. It is individual
freedom that is envisaged. Respect and recognition of the elections of each
individual is guaranteed. Moreover, the state is duty bound to protect
individuals from acts of third parties who might deprive her/him of their right
to choose. This is implied in the tripartite typology of state obligations. In
additi0l) the fact that this right is to be exercised "any where within the
national territory" means that regional states cannot discriminate against the
nationals of other member states of the federation. The right to choose the
means of livelihood, occupation and profession imposes a more or less similar
obligation with the first ( Article 41(2)) But it should be recognized that the
choice must be supported by the capacity of the applicant which makes
him/her fit for his selection. Dreaming an occupation inconsiderate of capacity
is unacceptable.
The third sub-article reiterates the right to equal access to publicly funded
social services. Accessibility may take different dimensions. One aspect of it is
non-discrimination, ensuring access to all without discrimination on the basis
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of the prohibited grounds. The other aspect is physical accessibility whereby
the safe physical reach of individuals to such services is maintained. Economic
accessibility requires that the enjoyment of these services be affordable to all
especially the disadvantaged. Article 41(3) clearly refers to the non-
discriminauon aspect of the right to accessibility. This linkage only requires
the state to overrule laws or policies that have the effect of excluding groups
from the full and equal enjoyment of publicly funded social services. This
provision does not, however, impose an obligation on the state to provide social
services to all Ethiopians for free or even for payment. But the positive aspects
of the right to equality should not be disregarded. Equality of treatment
usually requires positive measures to help the disadvantaged". Hence, the duty
of the state to create an enabling environment which makes it possible for
people to gain access to these rights and improve their lives is implicit. The
duty to protect imposed on states should also be noted.
The real socio- economic rights, like that envisaged by the lCESCR, are to be
found under Article 41 (4) and (5). The main character of socio-economic rights
is that they presuppose a proactive government. These two provisions are fair
indicatives of this nature of such rights. The qualified duty of the state to
strive to provide to the public health, education and other social services has
gained expression in the constitution, too. Health and education are only
illustrative and the term "other social services" may include housing, food,
water, social security and others .. The obligation is qualified in that the state is
required to assign an "ever increasing resources" to achieve such socio-
economic goals clothed as human rights. There is, however, no indication as to
the level of increase. Nor is there any sign as to the priority that should be
accorded to the different social services in the face of budget constraint.
As far as I can see, Article 41 (4) does not guarantee an individual right to
health or education for instance. It only imposes a general promotional duty on
)
the government in providing these services. The formulation is different from
94
that in the ICESER in that, the constitution does not include the term
"everyone" or "every Ethiopian" as entitled to the right to health, education etc.
The constitution also includes a provision dealing with the rights with respect
to groups traditionally called the vulnerable. The right of the physically and
mentally disabled, the aged and children without parents or guardians are
guaranteed the right to rehabilitation and assistance. It is important to note
that victims of disasters, the unemployed, the poor and other vulnerable
groups are not designed to be beneficiaries. Moreover, quite understandably, the
obligation of the state is only to the extent its resources permit. This
acknowledges the practical impossibility of giving everyone what he needs. It is
only ideal to think otherwise as it is not affordable even to the most developed
states. Compared to article 41 (4), 41 (5) is relatively very individualized and
may be the subject of separate/ individual rights actions.
The constitution also implies a duty on the state to choose job expansive
policies for the unemployed and the poor. Part of this is the duty of the state to
undertake programs and public works projects." The poor and the unemployed
have gained expression here," All measures necessary" to provide citizens with
gainful employment should also be taken by the state.' What is appropriate may
change with the surrounding circumstances. The government has a margin of
discretion in this respect. The right to work with its several dimensions is also
guaranteed."
The constitution also includes basic socio-economic rights under the policy
principles and objectives. The policies of an economic nature include equitable
wealth distribution, assistance to victims of natural disasters.' Access to public
health, education, clean water, housing, food and social security are the social
objectives to be achieved in the long term." It should be noted that "access" as
used here refers to all aspects of the term including physical and economic
accessibility. Moreover, the phrase "to the extent the country's resources
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permit" should be emphasized. These policy principles and objectives are very
relevant in that they guide the implementation of laws, the constitution and
other polices. 9
Policies and guiding principles of state policy are in principle not enforceable in
courts or any other extra judicial organs. But they have proved their worthiness
in many respects. Firs.,; they play important interpretative role by being read
into those rights which are considered enforceable. The experience of India is
worth mentioning in this respect. How the Indian Supreme Court changed those
guiding principles, despite the clear constitutional hurdle, into enforceable
rights was explained in detail in chapter III of this paper. Another relevance of
these policy guidelines is that they serve to insulate laws and legislations which
tend to interfere with or limit a right otherwise protected. Consideration of
socio-economic goals is accepted as a legitimate reason to limit civil and
political rights. Social justice sometimes requires interfering with individual
freedoms, The European Court of Human Rights decided in this respect that:
Eliminating what are judged to be social injustices is an example of the
functions of a democratic legislature. More especially societies consider
housing of the population a prime social need the regulation of which
can not entirely be left to play of market forces. The margin of
appreciation is wide enough to cover legislation aimed at securing
greater social justice in the sphere of people 's homes even where such
legislation interferes with existing contractual relations between private
parties and confers no direct benefit on the state or the community at
large. 10
In this case, the Court considered the right to housing as a legitimate aim for
restricting the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's possession. This has a
highly inspirational power on the roles of the House of Federation in
entertaining on cases of constitutionality of a particular law at least in the
future.
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All in all, it can be said that the Ethiopian constitution has recognized a number
of socio-economic rights. The policy principles and objectives are also far
sighted to include many aspects of such rights. However, the rights expressed
before as real-economic rights are not well elaborated. The general and unclear
nature of the terms used in the constitution with respect to socio-economic
rights might raise complexities. It is even doubtful, at fir3tvie~ if the House of
Federation can entertain cases based on articles 41 (4). and (5). Nevertheless,
Ethiopia has gone far in providing for enforceable socio-economic rights under
the constitution which only few modern laws has done. It is also
understandable that the constitution uses qualified terms such as " ever
increasing resources" and "within available means" which take in to account
the enormity of challenges these rights pose on any government.
In addition to the constitution, Ethiopia has adopted legislations intended to
give effect to the general socio-economic rights provisions of the constitution.
A legislation for the protection of the environment and the safeguarding of
human health and wellbeing exists." This proclamation imposes a positive
obligation on the state agencies to achieve its objects. 12 More importantly, this
proclamation restrains the government, inter alia, from engaging in activities
that might cause serious environmental damage. There are also laws
formulated to protect individuals from arbitrary government interference in
their enjoyment of their right to housing." This law allows expropriation/
appropriation only in limited circumstances and also provides for
compensation to victims. There also exists a public health proclamation which
sets certain standards designed to protect the health of consumers .14 All these
laws are mechanism of discharging the duty to protect of the government with
respect to the said socio-economic rights.
Most importantly, the Ethtopiadegtslature has ratified a number of international
and regional human rights instruments incorporating a bundle of socio-
economic rights and a consequent obligation on the state. The principal and
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most comprehensive instrument in this respect is the ICESCR.1s This covenant
ilTIpOSeSunequivocal obligation on states to respect, protect and strive to fulfill
the entitlements clothed with the authority of a right. Similar to the
constitution, the Covenant limits the obligation of states to the resource
capacity of states parties. In addition to the ICESCR, Ethiopia has ratified the
CRC, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the African Convention
of the Rights and Welfare of the Child and others." All these instruments
include aspects of both civil and political as well as socio- economic rights.
All these instruments are meddled in to the Ethiopian legal system through
Article 9(4) of the constitution. This provision suggests that ratification, without
any additional criterion, throws such instruments into our integral legal system.
Moreover, the constitutionally higher status accorded to ratified human rights
instruments is expressed in bald terms." One can surely say that those
instruments are given a status above, or at least equal to, the chapter of
fundamental rights and freedoms (note that the constitution uses the word
1/adopted" suggesting that it includes not only ratified but also signed
instrumenta They stand higher in the vertical ladder of laws in Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian baggage of socio-economic rights, therefore, consists of these
three sources: the constitution, scattered legislations and a number of
international human rights instruments ratified by the legislature. The power to
rule on matters stemming from the constitution lies with the House of
Federation 18, an organ outside the ordinary court structure. It is a political
organ composed of members representing the Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples. 19
Since the task of this paper is to reveal the power of Ethiopian courts in ruling
on socio-economic rights, the emphasis then is on the few legislations and the
ratified human rights instruments. Since these rights are scattered in a number
of international instruments ratified by Ethiopia, any problems courts may face
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in enforcing such human rights instruments necessarily bears up on socio-
economic rights. It is, therefore, crucial to consider and tackle the principal
hindrances casting a shadow on the role of courts in their attempt to prove as
ultimate guarantors of such rights. This leads me to the next brief but highly
invaluable part dealing with problems of enforcements of international human
rights treaties ratified by Ethiopia.
4.2 Problems of Enforcement of Ratified International Human
Rights Instruments through Courts in Ethiopia
As noted earlier, Ethiopia is a party to a number of universally recognized and
adopted human rights instruments. The constitution has also secured them a
fairly high rank in the hierarchy. Quite surprisingly, however, the judicial
enforcement of these entrenched rights is very minimal. No mention of some of
the ratified instruments has so far been observed at all in courts. This back
sliding can be attributed to a number of problems surrounding the Ethiopian
human rights system. The main reasons suggested for the under scale
performance of courts in this respect are:
Ignorance of the high constitutional status of ratified human
rights instruments in the Ethiopian hierarchy of laws
Problems associated with the authority to interpret the
constitution.
The prevailing views surrounding Ethiopian lawyers especially
judges, which seem to be ignorant of international human rights
instruments and their status in Ethiopia.
All these problems stem from the failure of our legislature to ensure that
ratified human rights instruments are given wide publicity so that the whole
population in general and lawyers and judges in particular will take notice of
them. The responsibility of the president to proclaim in the Federal Negarit
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Gazeta international agreements approved by the House of Peoples
Representatives i.5' constitutionally imposed. 20 The practice in this respect is
awful though. It is only the fact that a particular instrument is ratified by the
legislature that gains expression in the law Gazeta. No details containing the
whole content of such instruments can be found. Some instruments are even
denied this loose procedure. 21The repetition of the practice indicates that the
procedure is deliberate and not a result of excusable ignorance. This seems to
be being inconsiderate of the constitutionally imposed duty on the legislature
as well as on the president.
The absence of full publication of the instruments coupled with the debatable
issue on the constitutional requirement of publication as a validity factor has
worsened the complexities. The House of Federation, the organ with a final say
on constitutional issues, has not taken a clear stand on the publication debate
yet. Moreover, the reluctance of Ethiopian lawyers and judges in particular to
pressure this House to settle this debatable issue continues. The controversy is
constitutional which has hindered the development of Ethiopia human rights
jurisprudence in courts.
Be this as it may, my stance on the issue is clear. Article 9 (4) of the
constitution will be meaningless if it was not meant to do away with the
publication requirement. Had it been a requirement, the constitution could have
done that in unequivocal terms by adding)for instanc "up on publication" at
the end of this provision. Moreover, the purpose behind publication of laws
does not support the presence of the requirement with respect to human rights
instruments which are designed to provide for entitlements to individuals by
Imposing obligations on the government. Individuals are right holders. It is the
government, the obligation bearer, which publication is meant to inform. But
the government has taken notice of the instruments through the process of pre-
adoption deliberations, during adoption, signing and ratifying such
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instruments. Hence publication adds no validity to the conventions which are
already valid through ratification.
{oreover, it can equally strongly be argued that the existing system of
publicizing ratified instruments constitutes one form of publication. No extra
forms are needed. Publication might take different forms and the existing
procedure is one of them. Hence the requirement is fulfilled for courts to give
effect to such instruments,
These arguments should not, however, be taken as belittling the precious role
that publication can play. Quite the contrary, it creates informed citizenry. That
is why, while ratifying a human rights instrument, a state is obliged to take all
appropriate measurer leading to the full realization of the convention within its
territory. Bringing the instruments to the knowledge of the public is necessarily
one of the commitments, Publication is the key then. It creates an informed and
right demanding population thereby contributing to good governance.
evertheless, the fact that such instruments gain validity through ratification
and not through publication, needs to be recognized by our courts. This imphes
that the power of our courts to apply ratified instruments without the need for
publicity has a firm legal base which in no way ignores the role of publication.
To make the situations wors~ the environment around courts discourages the
invoking of international human rights provisions. Judges are ironic towards
those lawyers who want to stress on international human rights instruments.
This shows the lack of awareness on the part of judges. This coupled with the
lack of awareness of the population about human rights and the reluctance of
those having knowledge of them to be assertive of their rights in courts
protracts the problems, This calls for the necessity to a country wide operation
to raise the level of awareness of the population of their rights and the redress
available to remedy any violations.
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The idea of what constitutes a violation should also be inculcated into the
minds of the judges. It will be very helpful in this respect if human rights
education is given more emphasis in all law schoolr of our universities in
particular. The duty to launch human rights instruments underlies every
ratified human rights instrument. One of the commitments undertaken by
states is bringing human right conventions in to the knowledge of the public
through different means, of which education and publicity are vital ones.
The lack of awareness on the part of the judges have made them allergic to
evolutions in the human rights field. The solution in this respect is clear. If the
sacred merits of the human rights system are to benefit our move to good
governance, the government must direct its undertakings to human rights
operations. In addition, the two houses should not be irresponsible to discharge
their constitutional duties. The Federation should as fast as possible settle the
publicity debate and the HPR must, inter alia, ensure that ratified human rights
instrument are publicized in the law gazette in a very understandable and
Ethiopian way. All in all, the Ethiopian legislature and the judiciary should be
positive to human rights protection and ready to learn from the developing
experience of the international community.
4.3. Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights in Ethiopia
The question whether socio-economic rights are appropriate for judicial
determination in a particular country may be answered based on three different
approaches. The first primarily looks for law that clearly (explicitly or
impliedly) deals with the matter. Such a law may answer the question either
expressly by referring to the matter or even impliedly. The second emphasizes
on the practice in the state concerned. It searches for the experience of courts
of such a state on the area. But this method is very important especially when
the matter is debatable from the perspective of the existing laws. It has also a
tremendous role in settling vague or ambiguous issues on the matter. It further
presupposes a developed jurisprudence on socio-economic rights matters.
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Resort for the third method is relevant when the above suggested answers
cannot adequately solve the matter. It is based on the opinion of the legal
academics of the state concerned in particular and the international community
as a whole. This however, only plays a facilitating role since it is not binding on
courts.
A) The Law
This part wonders for the answer primarily in the constitution and other
legislations that significantly support a wise conclusion
i. The FDRE Constitution
That the constitution gives emphasis to the promotion, protection and respect
of human rights is uncontroversial. The constitution exhausts about a third of
its whole part to human rights. It further extends the realm of our human
rights system by making reference to adopted human rights instruments. 22 Any
organ engaged in the application of human rights is constitutionally required to
give them meaning conforming to the spirit of such instruments. Moreover, the
duty of all branches of the state or federal government to respect and see to
the protection of human rights is enshrined in unequivocal terms." All these
are in fact extensions of the recognition of the invaluable import of the full
respect of the fundamental rights and freedoms early in the preamble as a
precondition for achieving the entire constitutional objective." The deep rooted
concerns of the constitution to establish a government based on the rule of low
deferential of human rights provide a reason for the constitution's existence.
The constitution has devised a mechanism to ensure that its reason to
existence are not empty <essels. The human rights provisions are more than
mere promises or hopes. Rather they are undertakings crying for respect,
protection and fulfillment. That is, the duty to respect and protect these rights
is imposed on the legislature, executive and the judiciary of both levels of the
government. That success in this respect is a result only of the combined and
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committed efforts of the federal and state governments as well as the three
components of each level of government is cautioned in the constitution. The
concern of this paper is, however, limited to the extent to which the
constitutional duty of the judiciary is given emphasis and how the judiciary can
fulfill its constitutional commitment.
The Ethiopian constitution does not contain any clear provision on whether
socio-economic rights are justiciable or not. The fact that these entitlements are
rights is, however, evidenced by the fact that they form part of the fundamental
rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution." They have also gained
expression in the part dealing with national policy principles and objectives."
Unlike the Indian constitution, these rights form part of both groups. This
suggests that Ethiopian courts are faced with a relatively easier hindrances in
enforcing them. However, since the power to see in to the provisions of the
constitution is reserved for the House of Federation, courts can not make
rulings based on the constitution. This forces me to stress on international
covenants ratified by Ethiopia and legislations adopted by the legislature to
analyze the role of courts in the protection and full implementation of socio-
economic rights.
Except constitutional interpretation, all judicial power is reserved to courts."
The traditional power of courts to settle disputes is maintained with such
exception. Judicial power can be exercised based on all laws forming an integral
part of the Ethiopian law. There may be express reservations of such power to
administrative agencies or other non-judicial bodies. In the absence of similar
provisions, judicial power remains with the courts. In addition to the judicial
power granted to courts, courts are given the right and the duty to ensure
respect for and protection of all human rights together with other organs.
Judicial power is a precondition and the only way through which courts can
discharge their constitutional responsibility. Judicial power is the power of
courts to entertain disputes and order redress when deemed fit.
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The right of everyone to judicial access and remedy is entrenched in our
supreme law." The matters which can be the subject of judicial determination
are not, however, clarified. The constitution says any "justiciable matter". The
criteria to identify these disputes are not, however, set out. The definition
needs to be sorted out in some future legislation. Some suggest that what is
justiciable is more or less well recognized". This, however, ignores the
difference in state approaches on what constitutes justiciable disputes. The
political view on the matter is impact full. Nevertheless, the role of courts in
determining the boundaries of these matters is enormous. The theoretical
justifications dealt with under chapter two are relevant in this respect. Whether
the definition of justiciable matters includes socio economic rights still waits to
be settled by Ethiopian courts and the legislature.
The constitutional duty imposed on courts to protect and fully realize human
rights provisions clearly suggests that, courts should be ready to order redress
to human rights violations. Only through judicial power can courts discharge
their duties. The duty is imposed to the extent of all human rights and no
discrimination is made to the kind of human rights, civil and political and Ese
rights. As long as an entitlement is recognized as a right, courts are expected to
play their role. It is imperative for courts then to see in to violations of socio-
economic rights recognized by the constitution and international instruments
ratified by Ethiopia. This clearly implies that the right of everyone to seek
redress to possible infringements of their socio-economic rights is
constitutionally established. It should be noted that, these rights have got a
place in the constitution. Moreover, Ethiopia is a party to a number of human
rights instruments incorporating these rights.
The fact that the right to equality imposes a positive obligation on the state to
help the disadvantage groups in the society is constitutionally evidenced. The
right of women to affirmative action provides an example. The right to
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affirmative action should in no way be seen as an exception to the right to
equality of treatment. It rather is an integral part of it. The traditional view that
equality relates to formal treatment of everyone in the same way is no more
acceptable. This view supports the idea that the law should regard all human
beings as equal bearers of rights and treat them accordingly by extending the
same rights and entitlements to all pursuant to the same neutral norm or
standard of measurement." The law per this view should not take into account
the social and economic disparities between people and individuals which
might be directly attributable to systematic discrimination in previous regimes.
TIns is inconsiderate of the pre-human rights regime.
That is why the constitution has impliedly rejected it by accepting the view that
equality needs to be substantive where the state plays an active role to fill the
gap between people, traditionally or due to some natural or social anomalies,
are disadvantaged and others. The right of disadvantaged individuals to special
assistance and that of disadvantage Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' provide
extra examples." Enforcement of the right to equality, therefore, presupposes
enforcement of those positive obligations which form part of socio-economic
rights of individuals and groups.
Another mode of protection provided by the right to equality is the prohibition
of discrimination. This requires that any benefits of socio-economic nature
granted to individuals or groups should not be discriminatory. In case a
legislation is adopted to grant social assistance, for instance, it must not be
limited to certain groups based on the grounds set out under Article 25 of the
constitution. Any such discrimination can be challenged as unconstitutional.
ii. Legislations
Other indicators of the possible justiciability of socio-economic rights in
Ethiopia can be found in some legislations adopted by the Ethiopia parliament.
In this respect, the federal courts proclamation is worth mentionimg." This law
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is intended to delineate the power of federal courts of different levels in
settling disputes on matters considered to be under the federal jurisdiction on
the basis of the constitution.
Disputes arising under ratified international treaties fall under this category.
Suits based on international human rights instruments form part of
international treanes ". No mention is made as to the nature of rights
recognized by such instruments. This implies that suits based on instruments
recognizing socio-economic rights can be litigated in courts which in turn
suggests that these rights are justiciable. It should be noted that international
treaties ratified by Ethiopia are determined to provide a basis for our courts in
settling disputes.
This proclamation, therefore, outlines the duty of courts to take note of
international treaties while settling disputes." This clearly suggests that
international treaties including human rights instruments can be made bases of
court judgments. Courts have the right and duty to adjudicate on claims based
on such instruments. Since no distinction is made as to the nature of the rights,
civil and political or socio-economic rights guaranteed by the instruments our.
Courts can rule on instruments incorporating socio economic rights.
This legislation is, however, very unclear and incomplete to determine the
specific court entitled to hear cases based on international treaties providing a
cause for action. In other jurisdictions a specific level of court is assigned for
human rights cases. In most of them, it is the High Court which has first
instance jurisdiction on the matter. Assuming that compensation will be
claimed against such violations, the court having jurisdiction can be identified
based on the limits put under articles 11 (1) and 14(1) of the same
proclamation.
But human rights issues are very difficult to express in money terms. One can
not tell how much the right to health or the right to life costs. This makes the
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issues far from money claims although compensation is the commonest
remedy granted by courts. Under article 14(1) such cases involving matters
which can not be expressed in money terms fall within the jurisdiction of
Federal First Instance Courts if the matters are not expressly reserved for
Federal High Courts or Federal Supreme Court. But no such reservation exists in
cases of human rights matters. This means that claims of human rights are to
be entertained be Federal First Instance Courts This, however, is an
unwarranted deviation from the practice in other countries. No special reasons
exist in Ethiopia that make First Instance Courts first choices. Our specialities
in fact support at least the Federal High Court taking into account the practical
incompetence of judges at First Instance Courts to give specific meaning to
human rights provisions which are expressed in bald terms. Nevertheless, there
still exists a confusion and it is very important to plainly locate the court
having jurisdiction to adjudicate on claims based on human rights instruments
as well as other ratified international treaties.
Incidentally, it is desirous to see the implication of this proclamation on the
publication debate. This legislation is clear in declaring that cases based on
international treaties fall within the jurisdiction of federal courts. In n1Yopinion
this assertion presupposes the existence and possibility of such matters in
courts. I do not think that in the face of the fact that very few treaties have
been fully published, this law is only designed for future application when the
time comes in which such treaties are published. This law, hence, suggests that
claims can be based on treaties to which Ethiopia is a party irrespective of the
need to refer to their publication.
Another legislation having implications on the area of justiciablity of socio-
economic rights is the Proclamation of Appropriation of Land for Government
Works and Payment of Compensation for Property." This low governs
expropriation proceedings recognized under the constitunon." Both the
proclamation and the constitution emphasize that expropriation appropriation
".
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must be for public purpose/interest. It is when such act is required by the
interest of the totality. Moreover, under both laws the duty to pay
compensation is imposed on the appropriating government agency." The
decision of the committee, or the municipality as the case may be, on the
amount of compensation is appealable to a court with junsdictiou."
The striking fact is that the decision of the "Implementing Agency":" on
appropriation is incontestable. Decisions on what constitute public purpose/
interest lie wholly within the unlimited discretion of this agency. This means
that no potential victim has a right for a court action to show that public
interest will be better served with a different mechanism, for instance, or even
to challenge the involvement of public purpose in a particular situation. Under
this proclamation, large evictions can be carried our without anyone
challenging such decision. This, however, is against the right to housing of
individuals guaranteed under the constitution as well as a number of
international human rights instruments to which Ethiopia is a party. Legal
appeals aimed at preventing planed evictions or demolitions through the
issuance of court ordered injunctions does not exist. (General Comment No.4.
para.17).
It is also possible to argue equally strongly otherwise. Judicial review of
administrative decisions is an inherent power of courts. Administrative organs
are required to follow fair procedures and make considered decisions. This
innate power of courts to reverse unacceptable decisions of such organs
survives except for an express provision otherwise. Under the present
proclamation, even though there is an express complaint mechanism to
challenge unfair compensation assessments, there is no prOVIsIOn governing
the presence or absence of such mechanisms to contest allegedly unfair
decisions to expropriate. That is there is no express or even implied rejection of
the courts inherent power to judicial review. The legislator through its silence,
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in can be strongly argued, has recognized the possibility of such complaint
against the decision of the agency empowered to decide on the appropriation.
To me, this position should be given priority for two reasons. One thing the
right to appropriation is limited only in cases when the general interest
requires it. Courts should be there to see if this requirement is indeed fulfilled
in each of the cases. Most importantly, any law must be interpreted in a manner
which makes it rights-friendly. This recognizes the paramount significance
accorded to human rights. Such interpretation will be in line with the nature
and constitutional right and duty of courts to protect the rights of those in
need. This implies one aspect of the right to housing, the right to respect, can
be enforced through courts. Government nuisance can be brought to an end
through court injunction orders if they are unfair and not earmarked for public
purpose.
From the perspective of the first argument, it can be said that even the negative
aspect of the right to housing is denied access to court! justice. The implication
in this proclamation tends to destroy the idea that courts can provide an
overwhelming protection to human rights in general and socio-economic rights
in particular. Under this proclamation, let alone the positive right to housing
not even government interference is subject to judicial scrutiny. When
generalized it can be said that socio-economic rights can not be subject of
judicial inquiry in Ethiopia as implied by this proclamation. This, however, will
be against the right of courts to entertain on matters based on international
treaties containing a bundle of these rights. It must also be noted that
international human rights instruments are the major sources of human rights
in any domestic jurisdiction and Ethiopia is no exception to this. This means
that the right to judicial remedy guaranteed under our constitution and
international instruments is given no place under this proclamation. This
necessitate that we should stick to the second position.
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The Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation has also some implications
on the present claim, 40 This legislation is intended to safeguard human health
and wellbeing through the protection of the environment. Most of the
provisions are designed to regulate the activities of non-state actors. This law is
reflective of the government's duty to protect the health and life of its citizens.
However, the government will not be liable for acts damaging or likely to
damage the environment unless it is the actor. That is there can be no violation
of the duty to protect of the government under this proclamation.
An exception is provided where urban administrators are required to ensure
the collection, transportation and as appropriate the recycling, treatment or
safe disposal of municipal waste through an integrated municipal waste
management system." The duty to ensure that adequate and suitable toilets
and containers and other required facilities are provided for the disposal of
waste is imposed on the person in charge of administering premises accessible
to the public 42. Thtseprovtsions clearly impose positive obligations and their
enforcement, therefore, constitutes the implementation of the right to health
and a healthy environment. These duties are subject to the complaint
mechanism entrenched under this legislation, first in the Environmental
Protection Authority, and in case the complainant is dissatisfied or when no
decision is made within thirty days, in court within sixty days from the date the
decision of the Authority was given or the deadline for decision has elapsed. 43
This shows that some aspects of the right to health are judicially enforceable
but only a limited aspect of them.
The duty of any person (including government agencies) to live up to the
relevant environmental standard in any of its activities is sanctioned under this
proclamation": Administrative or legal measures may be taken by the Authority
or the relevant Regional Environmental Agency against those who in violation
of the standard (set by the Authority) release any pollutant to the environment. 4-5
III
)18' If the measures taken by the authority are not satisfying, then a complaint
may be lodge in a court as provided under article 11(2). This demonstrates that
the right to health of individuals is protected, judicially as well as through
administrative measures, from the interference of the government, inter alia.
This means the right to health is protected in the negative from government
encroachment which makes it justiciable under this law. But still it is only few
activities of the government that affect the health of individuals that are
subject to judicial scrutiny under this legislation. And as mentioned earlier the
reluctance or failure of the government to ensure that private actors float
within the standards provided therein are not the subject of judicial inquiry.
All in all, it can be said that some aspects of the many dimensions of various
socio-economic rights may be protected in scattered legislations like the
aforementioned ones. Most of them impose a duty on the government or other
persons (Physical or juridical) not to interfere with the rights protected under
the realm of socio-economic rights. Protection and fulfillment aspects of such
rights are not at all mentioned let alone judicially enforced. This clearly reflects
the naive ness of our jurisprudence on socio-economic rights in particular and
all human rights in general.
It is not a choice, therefore, to rely on international instruments on human
rights providing a comprehensive system of socio-economic rights. In fact it is
undeniable that the law on human rights is much developed in the international
arena than any domestic system. But even in this sphere, as discussed before,
there are a number of problems involved in Ethiopian courts enforcing
international human rights instruments as a whole. Socio-economic rights
conventions are no exceptions to this rule. The idea of enforcing Socio-
economic rights in courts is even much more controversial than courts
enforcing civil and political rights.
Problems surrounding the publication debate worsened by the reluctance of the
population to rely on courts and be assertive of their rights, are not settled yet.
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In case a dispute arises based on international treaties, the easiest task for the
respondent will be to raise the publication issue. Courts with cloth this a
constitutional dress which needs the word of the legitimate organ, the House of
Federation. This is very much discouraging for the complainant which tempts
him to drop the case. Hence, the corresponding naive domestic jurisprudence
on the area.
What is true as the law stands to day is that, it is very difficult (if not
impossible) to take a clear position on the issue of justiciability of socio-
economic rights. The publication debate has made it even very doubtful if the
Ethiopian domestic legal system has a place for socia-economic rights. This is
the logical result of the confusion surrounding all human rights instruments
ratified by Ethiopia. The Constitution does recognize these rights but only in
few very vague words and without an answer to the question of their judicial
subjection. And if so it is the legitimate jurisdiction of the Federation, a non-
judicial body composed of members appointed by the political leaders of each
region. The presence of only few laws designed to give effect to socia-economic
rights of individuals recognized under the constitution and international
instruments has made it illusory to take a stand.
Even assuming that publication is not a requirement and that courts have the
duty to give effect to ratified but unpublished international human rights
instruments (Which, of course, is my view) the defense of non-justiciability is
sure to be faced with respect to socia-economic rights. This is evidenced in the
experience of fellow countries with a relatively developed jurisprudence on this
area. Some countries have gone to the extent of giving constitutional
expression to the non- justiciability of these rights." The case laws of some
other countries also prove the very bigness of this defense standing at the front
of any petition of the respondents (usually the government).
The answer to the question of justiciability of socio-economic rights in Ethiopia
is better waived. The present situations do not provide adequate premise for a
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sound and concrete conclusion on the issue. One thing is true though. The
development of the jurisprudence on socia-economic rights in any jurisdiction
necessarily encompasses the justiciability debate. No country can be an
exception to this. Prior developments on the area in other countries will also be
very impact full on junior countries in this aspect. The developments in major
international treaty tribunals and Committees or Commissions, as the case may
be, will also have a great bearing in domestic jurisdictions. Ethiopian courts
surely need to resort to the above to take the desirable stance on the matter.
The conclusions asserted by the writer are all based on implications. This is
not further supported by our case laws which are very scarce on the matter.
Nevertheless, these conclusions suggest the problems that courts face in
enforcing socia-economic rights can be broken through the intense involvement
of the right holders as well as the willingness of our courts to reach at
decisions and follow approaches cognizant of their premier role as ultimate
guarantors of the rights of individuals.
Despite the illusory domestic legal situations in Ethiopia, it must be clear that
the arguments set out in favor of and against the justiciability of socio-
economic rights under chapter II of this paper should inspire our legislatures
and the judiciary in taking the appropriate step towards giving effect to the
constitutionally and internationally entrenched socia-economic rights. This
invariably requires the recognition and implementation of the justiciability of
these rights. We are living in the century of human rights where priority is, and
should be, accorded to the paramount significance of the respect, protection
and fulfillment of these rights. Only this can improve the. intolerably sub-
human existence of the large majority of the population of the world as a whole
and Ethiopia in particular living in conditions of abject poverty.
It should be recognized anywhere that one of the best tests of the efficacy of
the fundamental rights provisions of our constitution and international
instruments and other laws is the extent to which the least fortunate, the poor,
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the oppressed, the defenseless ... (The list is unending) are accorded effective
entitlement and protection from the rich and the powerful including the
government. This necessitates the involvement of our courts. Justiciability
stands at the crux of all human rights. A right whose violation does not entail
judicial action is not a right as such. It is nothing but an empty promise.
Case laws of Ethiopia are also unable to clarify this illusion. Some countries are
lucky in that the legislation as well as case laws provide immense support to
analyze their human rights situations. It is even very rare to see court decisions
based on some internal legislations providing for some aspects of socio-
economic rights. Moreover, it is very uncommon to see cases based on
international instruments in Ethiopia. Some, including the ICESCR, have never
been invoked in our courts." This poses a question without a solution. This
suggests the insignificant value given to human rights law both by the
government as well as by individual holders of these rights.
Since the power to interpret and see into violations of constitutionally
entrenched human rights lies with the House of Federation, it can be said that
these rights are not benefiting individuals the way they are expected to be. In
fact, all these human rights provisions are justiciable in this House. Socio-
economic rights guarantees are no exception to this. But taking into account the
physical inaccessibility of the House to majority of the right holders, it is easy
to discern the little practical significance of the constitutional guarantees to
those who need them most. The difficulty involved in forming branches of the
Federation in different cities of Ethiopia protracts the problems. This coupled
with the immediate solutions that human rights violations need, leaves a
number of dehumanizing violations unquestioned. More over, Ethiopia is one of
the poorest countries of the planet. This implies that remedies to human rights
violations are also financially inaccessible.
This calls for the need to stress on parliamentary legislations and international
human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia. The practical problems involved
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with the Federation necessitates reliance on these laws as providing a
protective shield against atrocities that could be committed. The deprived and
the bruised should have a day in court. But considering the fact that the
number of such legislations is insignificant and the endless debate on the
publication issue with respect to ratified instruments, it is even more difficult
to tell if the human rights system exists in Ethiopia. The fact that most judges
are in favor of the need to publicize those instruments adds complexities to the
idea.
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Chapter IV
End notes
1. Preamble (Constitution of FDRE)Para 2.
2. Id. Article 2(3)
3. ld Article 35 (3) and 89 (4)
4. Id Article 41 (6)
5. ld Article 41 (7)
6. Id Article 42, for socio-economic rights see Articles 40-44.
7. ld article 89
8. ld Article 90
9. ld Article 85 (1)
10. The European Court of Human Rights, James and Others V the
United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 Feb. 1986.
11. Environmental pollution control proclamation, Proclamation No.
300/2002.
12. ld Article 5 (3), for instance ./,..4-;;'/-8..-NJ.. Pqn(ro ~tX- ~ c...J.AJI/LLt./L.-1 '" tA- .;
13. J\...Proclamation No. 401/2004
14. Public Health proclamation No.200/2000.
15. Ratified in 1993
16. Ratified in 1992,1998, 2002 respectively
17. FDREConstitution Article 13 (2)
18. ld Article 62 (1)
19. ld Article 61(1)
20. ld Article 71(2)
21. The lCCPR, the lCESCR,for instance
22. FDRESupra 17.
23. FDREsupra 1 Article 13 (1)
24. FDRE supra 1
25. See Articles 40-43.
26. See Articles 89 and 90
27. ld article 79(1)
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28. ld Article 37
29. Fasil Nahom, A Constitution for a Nation of Nations, an Ethiopian
Perspective (1997), Page 150.
30. Iohan de Waal, lain Currie and Gerhard Erasmus. The Bill of Rights:
Hand Book (3rded) in association with Lawyers for Human Rights
and Law Society of the Republic of South Africa (2000), Pages 32
and 33.
31. See Articles 41 (5) and 89 (4) respectively
32. Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation, Proclamation No. 25/
1996
33. ld Article 3(1)
34. Id Article 6(1)
35. Land Appropriation proclamation Supra 13
36. Article 40 (8) of the FDRE constitution
37. Article 9(1) of the proclamation and 40 (8) of the constitution.
38. Supra 35 Article 11
39. ld Article 2 (4) for definition
40. Proclamation Supra 11
41. ld Article 5 (1)
42. ld Article 5 (3)
43. ld Article 11 (1) and (2)
44. Id Article 3(1)
45. ld Article 3(2)
46. Nigeria provides an example, Section 6 (6)c of the 1999 Nigerian
Constitution.
47. Fitih Lehulum, vol. 9. No.1, a magazine prepared by Action
professionals' Association (APAP), June 1998 E.C
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CONCLUSION
It can be said that the level of recognition of socio-economic rights is rising
both at the national as well as the international level. The number of
constitutions guaranteeing these rights is increasing each day. Most
importantly, the justiciability of these rights at the domestic level is moving at
a slow but encouraging speed. Different courts have outlined their own
contours in claiming their right and duty to decide on socio-economic rights.
Some countries have constitutional provisions entitling courts to see cases of
violations of socio-economic rights. There is an express recognition of
individual rights to assert their socio-economic rights in courts. Other countries
have no such provisions but their courts have been active in entertaining cases
of alleged violations of these rights. What is fascinating is the approach in some
countries where courts entertain cases of violations of socio-economic rights
against a clear constitutional hurdle. Such courts are very active in confirming
their role as ultimate guarantors of human rights. Most of these courts have
followed an integrated approach to human rights protection. The principle of
indivisibility of human rights has opened wide floodgates to such courts.
It is still undeniable that there are countries where courts are very reluctant to
see cases of violations of socio-economic rights. Yet there are certain
developments in these countries where the principle of non-discrimination is
enforced through courts even is cases of socio-economic guarantees. This
knocks the closed doors of justiciability showing sparks through them and
wai ting to be broken. All in all, there is a very promising trend in confirming
the justiciability of socio-economic rights.
o doubt, Socio-economic rights form a significant part of the Ethiopian human
rights system. The enforcement of these rights through courts has, however, an
awful record encircled with some strong but surmountable hindrances. It can
be said that any stance concerning the justiciability of socio-economic rights in
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be said that any stance concerning the justiciability of socio-economic rights in
Ethiopia is very slippery. No strong internal base can be established based on
the law as it stands. There is no express provision capable of settling the
problem. The constitution leaves the definition and elements of justiciable
disputes unsettled. There are no plain criteria to decide whether socio-
economic rights are judicially inquirable. As part of the human rights system,
socio-economic rights face the problems trapping the system in Ethiopia.
Solving these problems necessarily facilitates the clearing of the illusion
prevailing in the system
Nevertheless, it can be said that socio-economic rights are justiciable in
Ethiopia depending on the available unreliable internal legislations. The
arguments for the justiciability of socio-economic rights operates every where
the issue is not settled in clear terms. Ethiopia is one. These arguments and the
implications of the invoked legislations prove the justiciability of these rights
in Ethiopia.
The absence of an explicit law settling the matter necessarily opens the door
for debate and hence a variety of stands each having their own reasons. It is the
view of the writer that the enforcement of socio-economic rights judicially
crowns courts as ultimate guarantors of each right. Ethiopia has moved with
the international community in acknowledging the rights as imposing legal
obligations and not merely programs or goals with no enforceable content.
Their acceptance as a right entails their justiciability for this is what a right
connotes.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The ultimate end of this paper is to reveal holes that exist within the Ethiopian
human rights system. A beautiful Ethiopia, from the perspective of human
rights can only be created if certain minimum arrangements are made within its
domestic system. If Ethiopia is to walk along this century of human rights; if
international human rights instruments are to breath life in to our poor record
on human rights respect, protection and fulfillment; if meaning is to be given to
the life of the least fortunate, the sick, the unemployed, the defenseless
portions of our society; if the level of the system of socio-economic rights is to
be raised higher; if courts are to prove themselves as ultimate guarantors of
rights .... , the following observations must be considered and implemented. The
orders should not be considered as expressions of levels of significance for all
are equally important and complementary to each other.
l. The House of Federation which is in charge of interpreting the
constitution must settle the publication debate. A final say on the matter
is necessary as most of the complications in our system are in one or
another way tied to this debate. In my opinion, it is also very important to
transfer the power of interpreting, at least, the human rights provisions of
the constitution, in to ordinary courts. Courts are by far more accessible
to potential victims both physically and financially than the Federation
which is fixed at the center beyond the reach of those who need it most.
2. The House of Peoples Representatives must give a clear and
comprehensive definition of justiciable matters under article 37 of the
constitution. A list of or criteria to determine the matters considered
appropriate for judicial adjudication is imperative. All the poor, the
voiceless .... will pray to the end so that the justiciability of these rights is
confirmed in clear legal terms. A legislative recognition of the justiciability
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of socio economic rights should be given. An express mandate is essential
to illuminate any illusion.
3. More domestic legislations designed to give effect to socioeconomic
rights recognized under the constitution and the international code of
human rights should be adopted. These legislations must recognize the
subjection to judicial scrutiny of the government for it acts (or omission)
constituting a violation of socio-economic rights. Unlawful interferences
should be judicially contested. The protection and ultimate fulfillment of
these rights necessitates the judicial inquiry of government measures
taken in this respect.
4. A clear law providing for the specific court having jurisdiction to entertain
cases based on international instruments is essential. As the law stands
today, there is no uncontroverted stand on this issue. It is highly advisable
that any violations of human rights have their first day at the Federal High
Court. This warrants efficient and effective determination of these rights.
5. NGO's and legal professionals must attempt to establish the tradition of
reliance on courts as well as help individuals to be assertive of their rights.
Raising the awareness level of individuals about their rights and the
availability of redress in courts is very important. In fact, this is one of the
obligations of the government while ratifying any human rights
instrument. This can be done through launching educational operations on
human rights. The introduction of civic education in to the educational
curriculum is a step forward in this respect.
6. Another most important task will be bringing about a revolution around
courts in their views on international human rights instruments. The high
status accorded to these instruments should be divulged to each
individual lawyer. Judges must be made aware that courts are the
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fountains of justice where all can have equal days. That they are ultimate
guarantors of all human rights must be inculcated in their minds. This
invariably requires that human rights law must be given a significant
concern in the future in legal studies. A time to time release of
developments in the sphere of human rights to judges and lawyers is very
imperative.
7. The socio-economic rights provisions of the constitution must be
formulated in a way that estabhsbs'separate justiciable rights. The way it
stands now, it is very hard to say they are entrenched to everyone. They
are rather very general and vague to be called rights. The constitution
must follow the formulation used in the ICESCR as well as other human
right provisions in it.
In the end, the realm of human rights and the problems associated with them
are far reaching. The problems identified and the solutions suggested are in no
way exhaustive. They only represent the major ones on the area of socio-
economic right. Full realization of human rights requires the best combination
of commitment and willingness of the government and the means of the
Ethiopian society.
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